Cubans: Anomaly or Pioneers? An Analysis of their Assimilation and Political Incorporation into the American Political Mainstream and the Measurement of their Political Influence in the United States by Bueso, Lara
Rollins Undergraduate Research Journal
Volume 2
Issue 1 RURJ Spring 2010 Article 3
4-1-2007
Cubans: Anomaly or Pioneers? An Analysis of their
Assimilation and Political Incorporation into the
American Political Mainstream and the
Measurement of their Political Influence in the
United States
Lara Bueso
Rollins College, Lbueso@rollins.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.rollins.edu/rurj
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Rollins Scholarship Online. It has been accepted for inclusion in Rollins Undergraduate
Research Journal by an authorized administrator of Rollins Scholarship Online. For more information, please contact wzhang@rollins.edu.
Recommended Citation
Bueso, Lara (2010) "Cubans: Anomaly or Pioneers? An Analysis of their Assimilation and Political Incorporation into the American
Political Mainstream and the Measurement of their Political Influence in the United States," Rollins Undergraduate Research Journal:
Vol. 2: Iss. 1, Article 3.
Available at: http://scholarship.rollins.edu/rurj/vol2/iss1/3
Cubans: Anomaly or Pioneers?
An Analysis of their Assimilation and Political Incorporation into 
the American Political Mainstream and the Measurement of their 
Political Influence in the United States
Lara M. Bueso
A Senior Honors Project Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of 
Requirements of the Honors Degree Program
Defended April 27, 2007
Faculty Sponsor: Dr. Richard Foglesong
Winter Park,
Rollins College
1
Bueso: Cubans: Anomaly or Pioneers?
Published by Rollins Scholarship Online, 2010
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT………………………………………………………………………...i
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS…………………………………………………………ii
INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………………………..1
CHAPTER 1: EXILES AND ASSIMILATION……………………………………9
Historical Setting
Highest Level of Educational Attainment
Language Spoken in the Home
Intermarriage
Conclusion
CHAPTER 2: ENCLAVES, SUPPORT AND POLITICAL INCORPORATION…37
Naturalization and voter Turnout
Political Action Committees and Campaign Donations
Influence on Foreign Policy 
Conclusion
CHAPTER 3: ANOMALY OR PIONEERS?.............................................................55
Case Study: Cuban and Mexican-Americans
Case Study: Cuban and Nicaraguan-Americans
Political Preferences
Conclusion
BIBLIOGRAPHY……………………………………………………………………83
MIAMI: PHOTOGRAPHS THROUGH TIME……………………………………..87
2
Rollins Undergraduate Research Journal, Vol. 2 [2010], Iss. 1, Art. 3
http://scholarship.rollins.edu/rurj/vol2/iss1/3
ABSTRACT
My thesis studies how Cuban American immigrants achieved political influence 
in the United States and whether other Hispanic immigrant groups can attain similar 
successes. The study found a correlation between assimilation and political incorporation. 
I evaluated Cuban American assimilation via three proxy variables: education, language 
spoken in the home, and intermarriage. I concluded that Cuban Americans are an 
anomaly among Hispanic immigrants. The underlying reason is the way in which they 
were treated by the United States government, and how much government support they 
received. This observation was followed by a comparison with Mexican Americans who 
were not granted government assistance upon arrival in the U.S. and have yet to achieve 
as much political influence, as well as with Nicaraguan Americans who received belated 
assistance. Identifying the variable that allowed for increased assimilation and political 
incorporation presents the government with an opportunity. If the U.S. wants to 
accelerate immigrant political participation, they must bestow legal immigrants with 
benefits such as professional revalidation programs, and access to American resident 
programs. The overall social welfare function is maximized by incorporating these 
immigrants swiftly into the economic and political mainstream. The payoff for American 
society is a more productive workforce that is more self-reliant and forms the impetus for 
increased job creation and business formation. The Cuban experience in Miami reveals 
that their political and economic assimilation allowed them to transform Miami 
culturally, socially, politically and perfect it as the gateway to Latin America, adding an 
additional rubric of trade for the country. 
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“Culture, which makes talent shine,
is not completely ours either,
nor can we place it solely at our disposal.
Rather, it belongs mainly to our country,
which gave it to us, and to humanity,
from which we receive it as a birthright.”
- Jose Marti
INTRODUCTION
Hispanics are challenging the simple black and white definitions of what it means 
to be an American. As Hispanics continue to immigrate to the United States, the U.S.
Census Bureau projected that, by 2050, there will be over 100 million Hispanics or that 
24.4 percent of the total population will be of Hispanic origin.1 The U.S. receives the 
greatest amount of its immigrants from Mexico, Central and South America, and the 
Caribbean islands, owing to the proximity and poor economies of these countries. 
Attracted by political freedoms and economic opportunities, Hispanics generally emigrate 
to already established Hispanic enclaves in California, Texas, New York, and Florida to 
seek employment opportunities. 
While continual immigration will allow for the United States Hispanic population 
to increase, this thesis is more concerned with those already in the United States. I 
studied the relationship between Cuban-American families settling in the U.S., their
assimilation process from the original immigrant through successive generations, and the 
subsequent effect of assimilation on their rate of political incorporation. Political 
incorporation, defined by participation in the electoral process through various means 
                                                
1 U.S. Census Bureau, available at: http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/usinterimproj/natprojtab01a.pdf
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such as voting, donating to Political Action Committees (PACs), attending town 
meetings,  lobbying for policy changes, for example, is dependent on how integrated a 
specific group is in the host society. Hispanic immigrants, as a monolithic entity, are 
often politically disenfranchised because of feelings of exclusion, the lack of connection 
to current policy, low economic security and language barriers. Interestingly, this 
generalization does not apply to Cuban Americans, who are characterized as a politically 
motivated group. Cubans have experienced greater political assimilation, and thus they 
are more likely to engage in the political system. This makes them different from other 
Hispanic groups who do not experience much assimilation and therefore are not very 
politically active.2 I hypothesize that, if the government assists in the assimilation process 
by providing specific benefits encouraging integration, they can, theoretically, increase 
mobilization and political incorporation among these groups. 
Currently, Hispanics represent merely 14 percent of the total U.S. population and 
yet several political campaigns have already made costly efforts to mobilize and engage 
Hispanics.  As the population of Hispanics increases, American politicians must act 
accordingly. President George W. Bush, in the election of 2004, with much effort, 
garnered 44 percent of the Hispanic vote, an increase of nine percentage points from the 
previous election.3 Meanwhile, the Democratic Party was criticized for not allocating 
enough time and resources into courting their vote. Maria Cardona, senior vice president 
of the New Democrat Network that spent about $6 million in Latino-targeted advertising 
for Kerry, stated: "The bottom line is Hispanics are increasingly one of the most 
                                                
2 Alejandro Portes and Rafael Mozo, “The Political Adaptation Process of Cubans and Other Ethnic 
Minorities in the United States: A Preliminary Analysis,” International Migration Review, Vol. 19, No. 1, 
(Spring, 1985), p. 61. 
3 “Election Results,” America Votes 2004, CNN, 15 Apr. 2007,
http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2004/pages/results/states/US/P/00/epolls.0.html.
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important swing vote groups in American politics today."4  As Hispanic immigrants 
inhabit particular states with high concentrations of other Hispanics, political campaigns 
will devote more resources to acquiring their vote, which is necessary to win swing states 
such as Florida. 
There was a time when Republicans ignored minority voters because they 
historically tended to vote Democrat. However, like certain swing states, the Hispanic 
vote may be unpredictable. The increase in the Hispanic population, and its propensity to 
support Catholicism, has the potential to increase the base support for conservative issues 
on family values and religion that resonate well with Hispanics. At the same time, 
Republican Hispanic support may weaken as a result of harsh immigration policies. 
Democrats, fighting to obtain some solidarity in the South, have an opportunity to regain 
some clout amongst a struggling minority group on social issues.
What will the future Hispanic demographic look like in the United States? How 
well will immigrant children adopt American culture, and how does their assimilation 
relate to political involvement and influence over elections? These are questions that the 
nation should be considering rather than debating about how long to make the barricade
between the Mexican and American border. 
While I am interested in Hispanic assimilation and political incorporation overall, 
Hispanics are by no means a monolithic voting group. To research each Hispanic group 
by country of origin would necessitate greater than one year’s time and thus extends past 
my limitations. The characterization of Florida as a swing state, my partial Cuban 
heritage and residency in the state prompted me to concentrate my study on Cubans in 
                                                
4 “Outreach Effort Lures Hispanics to Bush,” ABC 7, 15 June 2007.
http://www.wjla.com/news/stories/1104/185300.html.
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Florida. Their experience is a valid example of the larger phenomenon of Hispanics 
because, as Cubans assimilate, I theorize that second and third-generation Cubans vote 
more in line with mainstream non-Hispanic whites, focusing on socioeconomic issues as 
opposed to more conservative issues such as position against Cuba. The unique Cuban 
experience and history, as detailed in subsequent chapters, is a large part of what enabled
them to achieve the highest assimilation and political incorporation rates among all 
Hispanics. This claim warrants some explanation and background information. 
Following the mass exodus of Cubans to America in 1959 in response to Fidel 
Castro’s rise to power, Cubans now represent a large voting bloc in Florida, particularly
in Miami, where three of every five Cubans in the U.S. reside.5 As they settle, assimilate, 
and engage in political activity, Cubans are distinct in many ways from the rest of the 
Hispanic population, most notably in their tendency to vote Republican. There have been 
four distinct waves of migration: 1959-1962, when 200,000 Cubans migrated generally 
from the upper classes; 1965-1973, when the U.S. conducted “freedom flights” and 
260,500 applicants were permitted to leave the country in airlifts sponsored by the U.S.; 
1980-1981, which is characterized as the Mariel boatlift period and 125,00 Cubans,
including those from lower socio-economic classes, left; and finally 1982-1994, when 
Cuba announced it would not restrain Cubans from leaving the country by raft or sea 
vessel and, consequently, over 40,000 balseros successfully confronted the 90-mile 
distance between Cuba and the U.S.6
More than one million Cubans have both “emigrated” (with supposed intentions 
of returning to their homeland) and immigrated to the United States, settling 
                                                
5Lisandro Perez, “Growing Up Cuban in Miami,” in Ruben Rumbaut and Alejandro Portes, Ethnicities: 
Children of Immigrants in America (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2001), p. 91.
6 Lisandro Perez, “Growing up Cuban in Miami,” p. 93-94.
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predominately in Miami.7 They dominate the political scene in South Florida and have 
more recently become a leading demographic in political elections in the twenty-first 
century. Hispanics account for 12 percent of Florida’s electorate, and Cubans make up 
31.1 percent of all Hispanics in Florida.8
The guiding assumptions in my study of this case is that as Cuban Americans 
assimilate and become politically incorporated, certain characteristics that used to 
distinguish them as conservative, such as religion and policy against Cuba, evolve and 
Cubans vote more in line with non-Hispanic whites than any other Hispanic nationality. 
While I presume that there is some convergence among Hispanics and Cubans as they 
both assimilate, Cubans have made greater efforts at integrating into the political scene 
than other Hispanics. Cubans may see political elections not through the eyes of a 
Hispanic immigrant, but with mainstream America instead. Is the Cuban diaspora an 
anomaly whose experience is likely to be emulated by Hispanics in general?
My thesis will first address Cuban assimilation. While many variables exist to 
measure assimilation, this thesis is intended to be a political rather than a sociological 
analysis of Cuban assimilation. Therefore, I will use census data to gather information 
and study trends of Cuban behavior based on three major indications of assimilation:  
level of education, language spoken in the home, and intermarriage. Consistent studies of 
immigrants have proven that status background has had a significant positive effect on
the rate of assimilation. Wealthier groups with longer periods of residence in the host 
country are more likely to identify as American rather than Cuban. Education and 
                                                
7 U.S. Census of Population,2000, American Fact Finder, 18 April 2007,
http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/DTTable?_bm=y&-geo_id=01000US&-
ds_name=ACS_2005_EST_G00_&-mt_name=ACS_2005_EST_G2000_B03001
8 Adam C. Smith, “Parties Court the Ultimate Swing Vote: Florida Hispanics,” St. Petersburg Times, 3 
May 2004, http://www.sptimes.com/2004/05/03/news_pf/State/Parties_court_the_ult.shtml.
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language are two of the most important variables in measuring assimilation because the
greater level of each, the greater the ease of mobility into the receiving society.  
Similarly, intermarriage outside of one’s ethnic group is a significant variable in testing 
assimilation as it demonstrates adaptation and acculturation. Hispanics are more likely to 
marry non-Hispanic whites than are Asians and African Americans.9 The relevant chapter 
will include tables displaying the data on Cubans as well as non-Hispanic whites for 
comparison.
Although assimilation may demonstrate the extent to which Cubans have adopted 
Americanized lifestyles, it does not measure mobilization and engagement in political 
activity. Therefore, the subsequent chapter will analyze political incorporation by 
measuring the trends of Cuban naturalization, voter turnout rate, and the availability of 
PACs specifically for Cubans and their financial contribution levels. Studying political 
incorporation is essential for the thesis because it will assist me in determining the range 
of influence this voting bloc may have on elections. There may be millions of Hispanics 
in the United States, but if they are not mobilized and truly engaged in political elections 
then the likelihood of their influencing policy is minimal and polls are likely to overlook 
them. An established enclave is central to facilitating incorporation into the host society 
and labor market, providing a series of networks and connections via culture and 
language. 
The final chapter will amass the previously mentioned data and use it to make 
assumptions about the extent of Cuban political influence. Furthermore, it will evaluate 
whether Samuel Huntington’s belief that Hispanic immigration is eroding traditional 
                                                
9 Sharon Lee and Barry Edmonston, “Hispanic Intermarriage and Identity: Trends and Implications for the 
Latino and U.S. Populations,” Department of Sociology, Portland State University, pp. 1-28.
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American values is correct.10 Are Cubans compared to Mexicans (the largest Hispanic 
group in the U.S.) and Nicaraguans (the only other Latin American country to send 
refugees following a communist revolution) truly an anomaly or can their high rates of 
political incorporation be mimicked by other Hispanics? 
I find it difficult to believe that among all Latin Americans, only Cuban 
Americans possess traits making them more inclined to participate in politics. Instead, I 
recognize that upon settling in Miami, they received unprecedented benefits from the 
American government, slowly encouraging assimilation and developed a greater 
awareness for using politics as a tool for policy change. Thus, high Cuban-American 
political influence is a product of the conditions associated with their arrival, not an 
experience repeated by other Hispanics. 
By discussing the emergence of a potential new influential voting bloc and the 
subsequent influence of Hispanic voters, we can examine the need for future policy 
changes as well. In the next 50 years, the United States’ ethnic make-up will undoubtedly 
transition. This paper is significant because it uses a case study to anticipate such 
transformations, suggests needed policy changes, and evaluates the opportunity for 
Democrats and Republicans to sway Hispanic voters to their side. 
I am going to study the Cuban case, focusing on the period 1970-2000, by 
examining the evolving views of Cuban immigrants via extensive research on U.S.
census data, literature on Hispanic assimilation, and scholarly journals on Hispanic 
incorporation. Although there is a history of Cuban migration to the U.S., long before 
Castro rose to power, Cubans began to immigrate in large numbers in 1959, and the 
United States did not take note of this massive exodus until the 1970 census. Previously, 
                                                
10 Samuel Huntington, Who Are We? (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004), p. 221. 
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Hispanics were rarely polled and, when they were, they were treated as a monolithic 
group. Thus census data from 1970 onward will be used to measure both assimilation and 
political incorporation. 
The initial wave of Cuban immigrants came disproportionately from elite sectors 
that were highly skilled, educated, and represented a middle-class similar to that of the 
host society. Furthermore, they escaped Cuba for political reasons and continue to 
maintain anti-Castro sentiments today. More recently, however, successive waves of 
Cubans migrated for socio-economic concerns, creating a population of Cubans that were 
less skilled and of a lower class. (Note the Mariel boatlift and Balseros.) However, 
despite the decline in human capital of those migrating more recently, Cubans maintained 
an economic edge over other immigrants. Today, Cubans are older, more educated and 
wealthier than other Hispanic groups.11 In fact, they seem to be more in line with 
mainstream white-Americans than their fellow Hispanics. This trend is fascinating and 
prompted me to study this topic and whether other Hispanics could achieve similar 
successes. 
                                                
11 “Cubans in the United States,” Pew Hispanic Center, August 25, 2006
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“Those who seek refuge here in America will find it.”
- President Lyndon Johnson, October 3, 1965
CHAPTER ONE: Exiles and Assimilation
They came in four distinct waves, leaving behind their home island for a new 
beginning in the United States. After Fidel Castro consolidated power on January 1, 
1959, masses of Cubans fled their country and found refuge in many different countries. 
The Diaspora saw Cubans flee to Spain, Mexico, Venezuela, Costa Rica, Honduras, 
Panama, and other Spanish-speaking countries, as well as the United States. This paper 
focuses on Cubans who settled in the United States, either through direct in-migration 
(fleeing from Cuba to the U.S.) or indirect in-migration (fleeing from Cuba to another 
country and then immigrating to the U.S).
 Those who were able to immigrate to the U.S. found that they were in the hands 
of presidential administrations that sympathized with their plight and showered them, 
however belatedly, with multiple and unprecedented benefits. The advantages that were 
granted Cubans have never again been given to any other immigrant population, and 
constituted a remarkable reversal in American historical immigration policy, making the 
Cuban immigration a sui-generis event in the American political landscape. The benefits 
included the ability to quickly revalidate professional degrees obtained in Cuba, thereby 
vastly accelerating upward mobility for Cuban émigrés, fast-tracking the road to 
citizenship and permitting this class of people almost immediate access to American 
13
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resident benefits, like Medicare, Medicaid, Food Stamps, unemployment compensation,
and so forth.12 These benefits stabilized the economic lives of refugees, and the ability to 
recertify professional titles, becoming professional members of the host country, allowed 
Cubans to leave behind the negative status connotation “refugee” holds in record time.
One must realize the context within which these benefits were granted, however.
And to do so one must fall back to the mindset of the day, to wit, the Cold War mentality 
and the zero-sum game played between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. during the 1960s. At 
this critical juncture, the Russian Bear and the American Eagle came very close to 
heating up the Cold War into a nuclear confrontation on two occasions, both times 
retreating from the very edge of plunging the world into an apocalyptical and complete 
end. The immigrants were then pawns in a worldwide chess game that was fraught with 
peril, and the cost of the assimilation was not the issue at that time.  Instead, Cubans were 
viewed as political refugees and given benefits that no other immigrant group received, 
eventually altering their mode of assimilation.  Thus, the Diaspora caused by Castro and 
indirectly by his Russian patrons was well received because the political climate was 
different than today, and the U.S. was less sensitive to the financial costs than to the 
political benefits of embarrassing Castro.
      Note that the politicians of the day were completely oblivious to the effect of 
opening the border to so many immigrants. The U.S. government attempted to disperse 
the Cubans, and thus not have any one community be so severely affected.13 They sought 
to minimize the impact of Cuban immigrants and thought that diffusion was the answer to 
                                                
12 Alex Stepick and Carol Dutton Stepick, “Power and Identity: Miami Cubans,” in Marcelo Suarez-Orozco 
and Mariela Paez, Latinos: Remaking America (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2002), pp. 76-
77.
13 Jose Llanes, Cuban Americans: Masters of Survival (Cambridge: Abt Books, 1982), pp. 33, 37.
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the assimilation of this ethnic group. Areas such as San Antonio in Texas, Union City in 
New Jersey, and the greater Washington D.C. area were chosen, as were places in Ohio 
and Michigan, as well as California and Arizona.14 But once inside the U.S., the city of 
choice for most Cubans was Miami.  The majority of first-wave Cubans either settled in 
or found their way to Miami, where several organizations such as Centro Hispano 
Católico and the Cuban Refugee Emergency Center, as well as funds from the 
Eisenhower Administration and several other volunteer agencies were available to 
welcome them.15
The efforts made by presidential administrations in the 1960s and 1970s have 
never again been matched for any other immigrant group, including other Latinos, which 
I propose is one factor that contributed to the unique Cuban assimilation experience. The 
term Latino lacks the specificity of other immigrant names such as “Italian American”
and “Irish American.” Latino encompasses all of those people from Latin America, born 
in Mexico to Cuba and Chile. How much do Mayan Guatemalans have in common with 
Miami Cubans? 
With these concerns in mind, I limited the scope of my research, as explained in 
the introduction, to Cubans rather than all Hispanics. While I will distinguish between the 
four waves of Cuban immigration, it is not possible to measure the assimilation of each 
cohort. Instead, my assimilation data, compiled from the U.S. Census Bureau, will 
measure ability to speak English from 1980-2000 and highest educational attainment 
from 1970-2000 without distinguishing among these different waves. There are, however, 
                                                
14 “Beginning of the Exodus,” Cuban Information Archives, 13 Dec. 2006, available at: http://www.cuban-
exile.com/doc_001-025/doc0001.html.
15 Robert Levine and Moises Asis, Cuban Miami (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2000), pp.27-
29.
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distinct differences between the characteristics of each cohort in the amount of education 
they received prior to immigration and their socioeconomic status, among other factors.  
Distinctions between the waves will be made prior to discussing data results in order to 
help explain certain outcomes. 
Due to limitations within the Census Bureau’s decennial census methodologies 
and experimental designs, I cannot extend my research back to 1960 as Cubans were not 
yet measured as a distinct subgroup. The 1960 decennial census was designed before the 
initial wave of immigrants descended on the U.S. and their impact was deemed worthy of
measurement. Furthermore, I look at assimilation with a third variable by comparing 
inter-marriage rates among Hispanics from 1970-2000. 
There is no single accepted definition of how to measure assimilation, and thus 
several scholars have chosen different indicators to conduct research. Assimilation as a 
concept is difficult enough to define and quantify, but the work is made even more 
difficult by attempting to approximate assimilation by proxy variables. One of the 
reasons that research is difficult is that the selected data sets were originally designed to 
measure other factors and thus create statistical anomalies when applied to my topic. I 
thus recognize the possibility of imperfections with the collected data; however, my 
general findings are supported by scholars such as Alejandro Portes and Lisandro Perez. 
This thesis is intended to be a political analysis and not a sociological study of whether
Cuban people, indeed, assimilated. It was a combination of their unique assimilation and 
political incorporation that yielded greater political influence in the U.S. Therefore, this 
chapter first seeks to explain the historical context in which the immigrants came with a 
brief description of each cohort. Certain factors, established prior to their journey to the 
16
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U.S., affected the rate at which assimilation was possible and the tendency to be 
politically active. This information is then used to illuminate and detail their patterns of 
assimilation in Miami post 1959, addressing education, language and intermarriage 
trends. 
Historical Setting
Following the mass exodus of Cubans to America in 1959 as a response to Fidel 
Castro’s rise to power, the population of Cubans in the U.S., but particularly in Miami, 
grew exponentially to the point where Cubans now represent a large voting bloc in 
Florida. As they settle, assimilate, and engage in political activity, Cubans are distinct in 
many ways from the rest of the Hispanic population. I presume that there is some 
convergence with the status quo as they assimilate and that second and third-generation 
Cuban Americans are more representative of non-Hispanic whites. For this reason, the 
research I conducted for Cubans in Miami is compared with non-Hispanic whites. I 
suspect a similar process also occurs with Hispanics at large. 
To understand how the high levels of assimilation affected each Cuban cohort 
differently, it is integral to first recognize the variations between the waves. The first-
wave of Cuban immigrants (1959-1962), who were primarily Western European 
Caucasians, the descendants of Spaniards of upper status and educational attainment, first 
immigrated to the United States as temporary exiles with the hopes of soon returning to 
their native Cuba.16 These people had an educational attainment, social standing, and 
racial /ethnic composition roughly equivalent to the Cubans who had preceded them and 
                                                
16 Alex Stepick and Carol Dutton Stepick, “Power and Identity: Miami Cubans,” in Marcelo Suarez-Orozo 
and Mariela Paez, Latinos: Remaking America (Los Angeles: California University Press, 2002), p. 77. 
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become exiled in the U.S. for brief periods, for example during the Machado presidency 
in the 1940s and the Prío-Socarraz presidency of 1952.  
The first-wavers were also a politically motivated group, and so gave ample 
precedence to the established practice of immigrating to the U.S. for brief periods in 
order to ride out a politically unfavorable result caused by a ballot box or a dictator. 
Indeed, the foremost Cuban patriot, Jose Marti himself, was an exile to the U.S. and used 
his stay in the U.S. to solicit funds from the small contingents of Cubans in places like 
Tampa and New York City in order to overthrow the Spanish colonial power that had a 
stranglehold on the island at around the turn of the 19th Century.17  
It was then not unthinkable for these first-wavers to believe they had to take up 
temporary residence in the U.S. to ride out the most recent political maelstrom that had 
beset Cuba. These people were used to being the political, religious, business and social 
leaders of the island, and, as such, fully expected to return to the island nation to re-
assume their place as the power elite.18  The difference between the first-wave of Cubans 
and subsequent immigrants is critical. The first-wave came as émigrés with the intention 
of returning to their homeland. For this reason, the first-wave’s willingness to assimilate 
was lower than others who made America their home rather than temporary stay. 
In the United States, the first-wave became a viable economic class that brought 
entrepreneurial skills vital to creating their own enclaves. At the same time, it was more 
difficult for the first-wave not to assimilate partially due to the need to work, the limited 
number of Cubans in the area and being surrounding by white Americans. This first-wave 
                                                
17 Carlos Ripoll, “Jose Marti,” Florida International University, available at: 
http://www.fiu.edu/~fcf/jmarti.html
18 Robert Levine and Moises Asis, Cuban Miami (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2000), pp.
27-36.
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preferred a hard-line treatment toward Castro, favored a U.S. trade embargo of Cuba, and 
any method of ousting the Castro regime.19 Paradoxically, it was the first-wave that 
created a dual identity as Cuban Americans and exiles, not fitting into either category 
completely. This group as well as others that came in subsequent waves, despite attempts 
to maintain their culture, unconsciously Americanized and thus assimilated at least
partially. Social tension continued to exist between Cubans who thought they assimilated 
well and Americans who believed that naturalization and the ability to speak English 
were the sole indicators of assimilation.20
With the threat of communism looming in many countries within close proximity 
to the U.S., President Johnson continued President Kennedy’s open-door policy, 
welcoming second-wave refugees of communism (1965-1973). This policy included the 
well known “Freedom Flights” which flew exiled families from Cuba to Miami.21 The 
majority of these refugees were relatives of previous exiles living in Miami. The second 
wave began diluting the small middle-class and transferred many productive citizens 
from Cuba to Miami. 
While the first two waves consisted of upper and middle-class immigrants, the 
third wave (1980-1981) was not as well received by the U.S. public. Considered 
undesirable because of their alleged origins (i.e. mental patients, criminals, and 
homosexuals), the majority of these immigrants were single black men.22 The third wave 
era is commonly referred to as the Mariel boat lift, and those who escaped called 
                                                
19 Guillermo Grenier, “Anti-Castro Political Ideology Among Cuban-Americans in the Miami Area: Cohort 
and Generational Differences,” Latino Research, Vol. 2, No. 1, November 2004, p. 4.
20 Maria Cristina Garcia, Havana USA (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1996), pp. 20-21.
21 Alejandro Portes and Rafael Mozo, “The Political Adaptation Process of Cubans and Other Ethnic 
Minorities in the United States: A Preliminary Analysis,” International Migration Review, Vol. 19, No. 1, 
(Spring, 1985), pp. 36-37. 
22Silvia Pedraza, Cuba’s Refugees: Manifold Migrations, in Origins and Destinies: Immigration, Race and 
Ethnicity in America (Belmont: Wadsworth Press, 1996), pp. 264-284.
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Marielitos. While they did have limited economic and political opportunities in Cuba, 
over 71 percent of third wave immigrants were actually blue collar workers with the 
concomitant skills possessed by mechanics, carpenters, factory operators, etc. 
Furthermore, the Immigration and Naturalization Services recorded that of the 124,789 
immigrants, only 19 percent admitted to serving jail time in Cuba.23 Thus the 
misconception of the third wave’s origins may have precluded their ability to assimilate. 
The majority are not necessarily criminals, blacks, or mental patients as was assumed, but 
were hard working immigrants who assimilated in a different way: by paying taxes, 
getting jobs, buying cars, and becoming part of the Miami work environment. 
Nonetheless, many light-skinned Cubans condemn the black Cubans as members of a 
criminal class, creating a divide between Cuban immigrants.24
One essential difference between the third wave and previous immigrants is that 
the Marielitos were mostly children of communism. Born after the revolution, growing 
up surrounded by limited freedoms, they never knew of the civil liberties that existed 
before and never served as members of the previous governments. They came 
sympathetic for their relatives remaining in Cuba and hoped to ease the strict embargo. 
They operated under a different work ethic, living in a communist system and were thus 
resented by first and second-wave Cubans and occupied vastly different areas of Miami. 
Moreover, these refugees came for economic freedoms as opposed to political asylum 
and their assimilation process was thus vastly different from the previous waves. They 
                                                
23 Pedraza, Cuba’s Refugees, pp. 264-284.
24 John Trumpbour and Elaine Bernard, “Unions and Latinos: Mutual Transformation,” in Marcelo Suarez-
Orozo and Mariela Paez, Latinos: Remaking America (Los Angeles: California University Press, 2002), p. 
141
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were less educated, spoke little if any English, and tried to break into an American 
economic system that earlier Cuban immigrants had already saturated.25
After the fall of the U.S.S.R., Cuba lost its best source of financing and their 
economy thus began to decline. The peso was devalued, free services such as health care 
and education began to disappear and the public became even more desperate. The 
fourth-wave era (1982-1994) was commonly referred to as balseros, literally, rafters.26
Lower-class families entrusted their lives to the 90-mile trek to freedom and attempted to 
raft the Gulfstream to the U.S. Due to the poor economic conditions in Cuba, many set to 
the streets in riots. The Cuban government, as a means to control the rioters, allowed 
balseros to leave freely. They were also characterized as the poor, uneducated and 
faithful revolutionary proletariats. They came with the intention of becoming Americans 
as opposed to previous exiles that came as émigrés. 
As the number of refugees increased, President Bill Clinton signed a migration 
agreement allowing 20,000 visas to be issued per year.27 Later, as a measure to curb the 
influx of immigrants, Clinton enacted the wet foot/dry foot policy which allows for any 
Cuban refugee who makes it on shore to stay in the U.S. and all those caught at sea to be 
returned to Cuba. As thousands of people set out to test their fate, U.S. citizens were 
bombarded with images on their local news stations of families, caught by the Coast 
Guard, in 1950s Chevys transformed into rafts, or emaciated men in tires swimming to 
shore, and images of some who made it 50 feet from shore before being intercepted by 
                                                
25 Susan Eckstein, “Cuban Emigrés and the American Dream,” Political Science and Politics, June 2006, 
Vol. 4, No. 2, p. 302. 
26 Lisandro Perez, “Growing Up Cuban in Miami,” in Ruben Rumbaut and Alejandro Portes, Ethnicities: 
Children of Immigrants in America (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2001), p 94. 
27 Perez, “Growing up Cuban in Miami,” p. 94. 
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police. It was not uncommon to see Miami Cubans on the beach shouting encouragement 
for refugees to make it to shore. 
By 1990, over one million Cubans had immigrated to the U.S. since the 1959 
revolution and the number continues to increase.28 With each successive wave, there were 
fewer opportunities for work as the Miami-area labor market had already become 
saturated. In addition, the great majority of those entering after 1980 became carpenters, 
waiters, bus boys, and so on, as most educated exiles had entered in the first two waves. 
They were mostly semi-skilled or unskilled laborers, particularly as they were used to 
using outdated technology. Each wave brought different aspects of their culture. The first 
were primarily Roman Catholic entrepreneurs, the second more middle-class, the third 
blue-collar workers and the fourth lower-income economic refugees.29 Each wave carried 
over their socioeconomic status from Cuba and transferred it to the U.S. Furthermore, the 
Cuban community created la Cubanidad, an effort to maintain their culture and establish 
enclaves.30 As the exiles established themselves in Miami, they created a dual identity as 
Cubans and as Americans -- but did not truly fit into either category, at times, being 
rejected by both groups. 
In measuring assimilation, the distinction between cohorts is necessary to 
understand how Cuban Americans translated their positive reception in the U.S. into 
increased assimilation and eventually political influence in Washington. As will be 
shown in the following sections, there is a correlation between immigrant assimilation 
                                                
28 Pedraza, Cuba’s Refugees, pp. 264-284.
29 Jason Berry, “Cuban Exiles in Exploring the Culture of Little Havana: A Learning Community Project,” 
(University of Miami, 2005) available at: 
http://www.education.miami.edu/ep/LittleHavana/Monuments/Virgin1/The_Virgin_Mary/Bay_of_Pigs/Exi
les/exiles.html 
30 Maria Cristina García, Havana USA (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1996), p. 83-85.
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and the extent of their involvement in the American political system. Cubans are the 
demographic majority in Miami and exercise political and economic clout but the power 
is not shared evenly among all Cuban Americans. Despite political diversity among 
Cuban Americans, the degree to which cohorts can exercise political influence depends 
on how much they have assimilated. Thus, I turn to assimilation rates among Cuban 
Americans in Miami. 
Highest Level of Educational Attainment
In measuring immigrant assimilation, scholars often look to education as a gauge 
of adaptation, and I make the assumption that the higher the level of education attained, 
the more assimilated the individual becomes. By the same token, scholars assume that 
increased levels of education are directly correlated to higher income levels. I will show 
that assimilation, inclusion and civic engagement are related to socioeconomic indicators 
such as income and education. 
 The most educated and the least educated people in the U.S. are immigrants.31
Immigrants enter as state-sponsored refugees, seeking political asylum and economic 
opportunities, through legal immigration channels or as illegal aliens. Professionals tend 
to have a more seamless adaptation into American society as they naturalize faster than 
do undocumented refugees for example.32  There is a correlation between higher levels of 
education attained and professional occupations, economic wealth, and integration. In the 
                                                
31 Ruben Rumbaut and Alejandro Portes, Ethnicities: Children of Immigrants in America, Los Angeles: 
University of California Press 2001, p. 6. 
32 Ruben Rumbaut and Alejandro Portes, Ethnicities: Children of Immigrants in America, Los Angeles: 
University of California Press 2001, p. 6-7.
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short run, education forecasts productivity and in the long-run it forecasts the assimilation 
of the immigrant’s children into the American economy and society.33  
Those who emigrated in the first-wave, fleeing Castro’s regime, were part of the 
elite, the wealthy and educated upper-class. In order to determine and track education 
levels among Cuban Americans, I use data from the U.S. Census Bureau, General Social 
and Economic Characteristics. Comparing Cuban Americans with non-Hispanic whites in 
Florida, I compiled information from 1970-2000 regarding highest level of education 
achieved. The absolute total numbers of graduates was given from the U.S. Census 
Bureau. To compute the percentages of high school and college graduates, however, I 
divided the absolute number of high school and college graduates respectively by the 
total number. My assumption is that education levels increased over time and contributed 
to their overall integration into American jobs and culture.
Table 1
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Current General Social and Economic Characteristics, Florida, 1970. 
1980, 1990, 2000
                                                
33 T. Paul Schultz, “Immigrant Quality and Assimilation,” U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform, May 
1995, p. 8. 
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Table 2
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Current General Social and Economic Characteristics, Florida, 1970, 
1980, 1990, 2000
Table 1 and Table 2 highlight the highest level of education achieved by Cubans 
and non-Hispanic whites in Florida. While the data show an increase in high school and 
college graduates overall, there is a decline in 1990. This decrease is due largely to the 
increase in balseros during the 1980-1990 periods. Recall that balseros were from the 
lower economic and educational brackets of Cuban society. Referring to Table 3, it is 
evident that those entering the United Stated between 1980 and 1990 had the lowest rate 
of education (13 percent) than any other Cuban wave (24 percent for those entering 
before 1980), reducing the entire average. 
Despite this dip, the percent of high school graduates among Cubans increased 
dramatically from 42.5 percent in 1970 to 68.71 percent in 2000. The percent of college 
graduates increased from 9.92 percent in 1970 to 14.81 percent in 2000. These 
percentages increased faster and at a greater percentage than did Non-Hispanic whites, 
which increased from 8.63 percent in 1970 to 11.56 percent in 2000 for college 
graduates. This is a significant finding and can be attributed to two explanations. First, 
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the largest source of population growth within the Hispanic population has been through 
immigration. As the amount of Cubans grew from a few thousand pre-1959 to over one 
million in 1990, Miami experienced a white flight in which many of the educated middle-
class moved northward, thus reducing the number of educated Anglo families in Miami. 
Second, Alejandro Portes and other scholars note the serious educational push supported 
by Cuban Americans was outmatched only by Asian immigrants. They realize the 
importance of education as a tool for success and have established themselves in Miami, 
transforming it into a gate-way to the Americas.34
In 2000, Cubans were the oldest, wealthiest and most educated Latinos in the 
United States. The median age of Cubans is 41.3 years, while the next eldest are Central 
and South Americans, who average 29.9 years of age. Furthermore, 24.8 percent of 
Cubans had a bachelor’s degree in 1998 compared with 18.0 percent of Central and South 
Americans.35 As is evident in Table 3, one in four Cubans 25 and older is a college 
graduate, more than double the rate of other Hispanics. Cuban Americans are more 
educated than other Latinos, and native-born Cubans show higher rates of college 
graduation than non-Hispanic whites. 
                                                
34 Lisandro Perez, “Growing Up Cuban in Miami,” in Ruben Rumbaut and Alejandro Portes, Ethnicities: 
Children of Immigrants in America (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2001), pp. 115-122.
35Marcelo Suarez-Orozco and Mariela Paez, Latinos, Remaking America (Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 2002), p. 27.
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Table 3
Data in table 3 was compiled by the Pew Hispanic Center. They used census data 
from 2004 to analyze only those Cubans 25 and older in the U.S. Cubans are the most 
educated and wealthiest Hispanic ethnic group. The high school graduate levels are 
within 10 percent of non-Hispanic whites nationally, but are greater than non-Hispanic 
whites in Florida. The native-born Cuban college graduate percentages, however, are 
greater than non-Hispanic white percentages both nationally and in Florida. Foreign-born 
Cubans show lower levels of high school and college graduation rates than non-Hispanic 
whites. It follows then that children of Cuban immigrants have higher levels of 
educational attainment than their parents, other Hispanics and non-Hispanic whites. 
Cubans are far more likely to identify as “white” than other Hispanics. According 
to the 2004 census data, 86 percent of Cubans identified themselves as “white” first.36
This is significant because those who identify primarily as “white” have higher levels of 
education and income. Thus, perceived level of whiteness is a measure of inclusion. 
                                                
36 “Cubans in the United States,” Pew Hispanic Center, August 25, 2006.
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Furthermore, the first-wave refugees’ “educational and occupational characteristics, 
combined with middle-class work ethic were not too dissimilar to that of the dominant 
sectors of the host society,” making their assimilation process less difficult than 
subsequent waves.37
The data has thus demonstrated that Cuban-American education levels have 
increased since 1970. Those with the highest education levels are native-born Cubans. 
The lower socioeconomic wave that entered in 1980 was the least educated and had the 
most difficulty integrating into mainstream America. As will be shown throughout the 
thesis, the more educated cohorts assimilated greater than uneducated immigrants.
Language Spoken in the Home
Using language as a measurement of assimilation is a fundamental way of 
demonstrating social change. Complete linguistic assimilation implies that a person 
transitions from speaking their original language to another language, and is no longer 
fluent in the original language. While losing one’s mother tongue is not likely to be 
experienced by an individual, I would argue that partial language assimilation (i.e. 
bilingualism) is still a sufficient measurement of increased adaptation. Learning the 
language of the host culture exposes immigrants to cultural innuendos and demonstrates 
the willingness to adopt the language. Maintaining the mother tongue does not inhibit 
immigrants from further adaptation (especially as some do so for educational purposes) 
so long as they also learn the host country’s language.  Furthermore, the primary 
language spoken in the home is a good indicator of bilingualism. Very few people have 
                                                
37 Ruben Rumbaut and Alejandro Portes, Ethnicities: Children of Immigrants in America, (Los Angeles: 
University of California Press 2001), p. 95.
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the capability to become fluent in another language outside of the home, i.e. in school or 
as an adult. For this reason, I used data tracking language spoken in the home from 1980-
2000. The data collected shows the ability of Cubans to speak English and reports the 
amount that continues to speak another language at home. 
In many instances Cuban Americans undergo involuntary linguistic assimilation. 
While attempting to maintain their native language at home, children are exposed to and 
forced to speak English at school. Eventually, children become so fluent in their second 
language it replaces their native language and becomes their predominant one. This 
process continues until Spanish is no longer spoken. I assumed before completing the 
research that within the 20-year period, the percent of those who speak Spanish in the 
home would reduce significantly. However, this proved untrue among Cubans and there 
are a few explanations for this finding. Evident in Table 4, in 1980, 95.26 percent of 
Cubans spoke a language other than English in the home, whereas in 2000, 91.87 percent
of Cubans spoke another language. Although there was a decline, it was very minimal in 
comparison to other variables in the table. This find is significant because it demonstrates 
a culture of bilingualism growing in Miami, a merging of American and Cuban customs, 
instead of a complete abandonment of ones cultural roots. 
This minimal decline is explained by three factors. First, the vast and concentrated 
enclave of Cubans in Miami reduces the need for involuntary linguistic assimilation. 
Older linguistic assimilation theories based on 19th and 20th century European immigrants 
allowed for a three-generation shift in which the original language was no longer 
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spoken.38 In a more simplistic version, the original immigrants preferred to speak their 
mother tongue, speaking as little English as possible to get by. Their children (the second 
generation) preferred to speak English on the streets, in schools and even sometimes 
while responding to their parents. As such, the second generation preferred speaking 
English in the home to their children and thus the original language is lost. While this 
pattern characterizes European immigrants it does not successfully capture the Spanish-
language history because the Cuban enclave in Miami allows for the survival of the 
Spanish language. 
Second, there is less pressure in the contemporary era, especially in South Florida, 
to speak English in the streets and even in schools. While children are taught in English, 
many of the teachers are bilingual, reducing the pressure to speak English. Furthermore, 
the language of the streets is Spanglish (a fusion of English and Spanish). Despite the 
debates over “English-only” moves by politicians to block bilingual education, the high 
immigration levels into South Florida and the number of Spanish-speaking persons made 
it possible to live and work without ever learning the language. Although it is easy to get 
by in Miami, for example, without speaking English, older linguistic assimilation theories 
should not be overlooked. The maintenance of Spanish is due to the close proximity to 
Cuba as well as the members of Spanish-speaking residents. 
Thirdly, Miami is the hub for Latin America, requiring many businessmen to 
maintain their native language and pass the language on to their children, not for ignorant 
purposes but for the realization that a second language is useful and necessary in the 
business sector. The presence of a Spanish-speaking enclave promotes bilingualism as 
                                                
38Richard Alba, “Language Assimilation Today: Bilingualism Persists More than in the Past, But English 
Still Dominates,” Lewis Mumford Center for Comparative Urban and Regional Research, University at 
Albany, December 2004. 
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opposed to encouraging Spanish-only speaking and explains the delay in Spanish-to-
English language shifts. 
This explanation is further supported by the increase of Cuban Americans who 
speak English. Referring to Table 4 it is evident that the number of Cubans in Florida 
who do not speak English “very well” has declined over the past twenty years. Despite 
the increase in the Cuban population, especially with the influx of lower socioeconomic 
Cubans in 1980-1990, who predominantly speak Spanish, the number has continued to 
decline from 60.45 percent to 35.20 percent. This data proves that while Cuban 
Americans maintain speaking Spanish in the home, they are also speaking more English, 
creating generations of bilingual Cubans. Moreover, Cubans in Miami learn English at 
faster rates than other Hispanic subgroups. Only 11 percent of second-generation 
Mexican children, for example, speak English at home, whereas 27 percent of second-
generation Cuban children are speaking English at home and in school.39
                                                
39 Alba, “Language Assimilation Today”
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Table 4
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Current General Social and Economic Characteristics, Florida, 1980, 
1990, 2000
The ability to speak a language is telling for social and political reasons as well. 
According to a study by the Pew Hispanic Center, the primary language spoken 
contributes to differences in attitudes among people. For example, 93 percent of Spanish-
only speaking subjects agreed that it is better for children to leave the home once they 
have married and not prior to that accomplishment. Compare that to English-only 
speaking Hispanics and the percent drops to lower than 71 percent.40 This is an incredible 
factor that shows how recent immigrants and those who continue to speak Spanish-only 
are socially conservative. This provides tremendous opportunity for the Republican Party 
to appeal to Spanish-speaking Hispanics based on social values. However, despite this 
advantage, Table 5 below elucidates how quickly their native language can be lost over 
                                                
40 “Assimilation and Language,” Pew Hispanic Center, March 2004, p. 3, available at: 
http://www.kff.org/kaiserpolls/upload/Assimilation-and-Language-2002-National-Survey-of-Latinos-
Survey-Brief.pdf.
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successive generations. While only 4 percent of first-generation immigrants are English 
dominant, 78 percent of third-generation Hispanics is English dominant. Those that 
remain bilingual also decrease over time, eventually losing the native language 
completely. 
Table 5
Source: Pew Hispanic Center, Assimilation and Language
Primary Language among Latinos, by Generation in the United States
The data in Table 5 included all Hispanics as opposed to Cubans alone. While the 
third generation demonstrates higher levels of English monolinguals, it is useful to note 
that bilingualism in the third generation is higher among Hispanics than it was for 
European immigrants and Asians. There were some German immigrants in the Midwest, 
pre-WWI, who established German enclaves and maintained their mother tongue through 
the foundation of charter schools.41 A similar phenomenon occurred in Miami when first 
and second-wave Cubans established private schools that reinforced their parents’ values 
and promoted bilingualism.42
In sum, the dense social networks established by the Cuban enclave reinforced the 
group’s cultural identity (la Cubanidad) but also encouraged increasing human capital. 
                                                
41 Richard Alba, “Language Assimilation Today: Bilingualism Persists More than in the Past, But English 
Still Dominates,” Lewis Mumford Center for Comparative Urban and Regional Research, University of 
Albany, December 2004.
42 Lisandro, Perez, “Growing Up Cuban in Miami,” in Ruben Rumbaut and Alejandro Portes, Ethnicities: 
Children of Immigrants in America (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2001), pp. 96-108.
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Bilingualism is much more common today in Miami than before, and children of 
immigrants are highly likely to speak English very well. Cubans learned to integrate 
themselves into mainstream America enough to capitalize on professional, political and 
intellectual opportunities. Proportionally, more Cubans are learning English and 
becoming English dominant than are losing their bilingualism. Thus, while three 
generation shift theories are applicable for some Cubans, in Miami, they may be a 
counterexample. 
Intermarriage 
Intermarriage trends are a frequent used indicator of assimilation. The ability and 
willingness to marry outside of one’s ethnic and/or religious group is seen in classical 
assimilation theory as a final stage of adaptation. There are constraints in the form of 
socioeconomic status, continuous flow of immigration, and language barriers that deter 
Hispanics from marrying non-Hispanics. Other difficulties arise in determining who has 
intermarried, or which ethnic background the offspring of intermarried couples choose to 
identify by. Often, in the case with partial Hispanic backgrounds, identification as 
Hispanic is greater.43 However there are still obstacles with this research. Intermarriage is 
not an indicator used by the U.S. Census Bureau in surveys, which limited the amount of 
independent research I could personally conduct. Thus the following analysis comes from 
research conducted by sociological professionals using public-use micro-data to compile 
information.  
                                                
43 Sharon Lee and Barry Edmonston, “Hispanic Intermarriage and Identity: Trends and Implications for the 
Latino and U.S. Populations,” Department of Sociology, Portland State University, p. 16. 
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Research concludes that if Hispanics marry outside of their ethnic group, they 
tend to marry non-Hispanic whites.44 Their assimilation is dependent on several 
conditions such as level of inequality, exposure to non-Hispanics, and sex-ratio 
imbalances.45 Imbalanced sex ratios do increase the tendency for one to marry outside 
their ethnic group. Cuban-American men outnumber females slightly, although there are 
significant differences when disaggregated by age groups. Between 25 and 49 years of 
age, men outnumber women significantly (116 men to 100 women), due largely to 
selective emigration that sent more men in the third and fourth waves. Women outnumber 
men after age 59 because they have longer life expectancies.46  
Robert K. Merton’s exchange thesis claims that intermarriage exists only when 
social and economic resources outweigh the racial disadvantages. In other words, only 
the more educated and financially stable minorities with significant cultural and 
economic resources will marry non-Hispanic whites.47 Research conducted by Jerry 
Jacobs and Teresa Labov confronted this claim and studied sixteen different ethnic 
groups, including Cuban Americans.
Their research is consistent with claims that more educated, wealthy Cuban 
women marry non-Hispanic whites than do Cuban men. However, this is a more recent 
trend within the last 20 years. Non-Hispanic whites have the lowest rate of intermarriage 
which is attributed simply to their numbers. The overwhelming majority in the country, 
their low rate of intermarriage is also due partly to their preference for endogamy. One 
                                                
44 Jerry Jacobs and Teresa Labov, “Gender Differentials in Intermarriage among Sixteen Race and Ethnic 
Groups,” Sociological Forum, Vol. 17, No. 4. (Dec., 2002), pp. 621-646.
45 Brian Brown, “Barriers to Marital Assimilation: Hispanic Intermarriage in U.S. Cities,” Population 
Association of America, 2003.
46 Sergio Díaz-Briquets and Jorge Pérez-López, “The Role of the Cuban-American Community in the 
Cuban Transition,” Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies, University of Miami, 2003. 
47 Jacobs and Labov, “Gender Differentials,” pp. 621-646. 
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aspect is consistent: spouses tend to marry those within their educational bracket whether 
they are marrying within or outside their ethnic group. And because we have already 
established that increased education achievement levels is an indicator of greater 
assimilation and that it also exposes minorities to a greater level of non-Hispanic whites, 
we may also conclude that the two are linked in increasing intermarriage and further 
adaptation. Other researchers found this conclusion to be valid: native-born Hispanics,
especially those with higher socioeconomic status (measurement by education and 
occupation) tend to marry non-Hispanics more so than the lower educated.48
College educations also promote tolerance and at the very least expose students to 
other ethnic backgrounds. College also facilitates the meeting between students who may 
have been raised in racially segregated neighborhoods. Access to college, however, is 
unequal, and Hispanics of Western European extractions tend to have more access to 
college than do Hispanics of black or Indian origin. Lower educated Hispanics, such as 
Mexicans who come to the U.S. to work in agricultural fields, are typically of Indian 
heritage and come from rural backgrounds, where education is harder to provide and 
therefore more scarce.
Additionally, intermarriage is important because it creates a multiple-origin 
population that mitigates endogamous norms and further merges the population. Cubans 
are unique in that they show high rates of intermarriage with non-Hispanics whereas 
other Hispanic people such as Puerto Ricans and Dominicans (similar Caribbean islands) 
show high rates of intermarriage with each other and very low rates of intermarriage 
                                                
48 Lee and Edmonston, “Hispanic Intermarriage,” p. 6.
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outside of their ethnic group.49 It is worth mentioning that a large percent of Puerto 
Ricans and Dominicans exhibit racial characteristics associated with blacks.  
In the thirty-year time frame from 1970-2000, census data demonstrate that 
Hispanic intermarriage rates increased by 50 percent among Cubans and by only 20
percent among Mexicans. Hispanic men and women in 1970 were equally likely to be 
intermarried while, in 2000, women were more likely to have non-Hispanic white 
spouses.50
As mentioned earlier, education shows a positive relationship with intermarriage. 
From 1970 onward, the proportion of intermarriage increased with education. According 
to the research conducted by Lee and Edmonston, 5 percent of Hispanics with less than a 
high school degree were intermarried compared with 15-17 percent of high school 
graduates and 28 percent of men and 35 percent of women with a college degree. Not 
only do intermarriage rates increase with education, but women are more likely to 
intermarry with increased education than men. Again, there may be an unuttered 
consequence – women that are educated may have traveled further to obtain that 
education, and the exposure to a more liberal, and diverse environment with a different 
proportion of men to women may explain most of this disparity, dovetailing with 
Merton’s assumptions. 
There is a strong tendency for intermarried couples to be younger, more educated 
and native-born. This research demonstrates the increase in intermarriage as one indicator 
of assimilation among Cubans, and for the “upwardly mobile, with socioeconomic 
                                                
49 Lee and Edmonston, “Hispanic Intermarriage,” p. 6.
50 Lee and Edmonston, “Hispanic Intermarriage,” p. 5.
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success came intermarriage and the further dilution of ethnicity.”51  Table 6 highlights the 
percent increase from 1970-2000; note the slight increase of female intermarriage over 
male. 
Table 6
The study of Hispanic intermarriage is important because it addresses potential 
racial challenges that confront Cubans.  There has been fairly stable intermarriage rates 
among Hispanics overall, but first-generation immigrants intermarry less than second and 
third-generation native-born Cubans.52 Thus Cubans already on the path to assimilation
have a greater propensity to intermarry. It is also true that intermarriage among first-
generation Cubans fast tracks them to mainstream American adaptation. Cuban 
Americans see themselves predominately as “white” and so intermarriage between a 
Cuban and Anglo is not as controversial as black and white relations. 
                                                
51 Rumbaut and Portes, Ethnicities, p. 95.
52 Lee and Edmonston, “Hispanic Intermarriage,” p. 12-38.
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This section examined the rate of Cuban intermarriage, motivated by the 
assumption that greater levels of intermarriage show a movement toward assimilation. 
Not only does it demonstrate acceptance by the host culture, but by Cuban Americans as 
well. Further, the increase of Hispanic intermarriage and the tendency for their children 
to report as Hispanic may alter the Cuban identity for the future. The roots of la 
Comunidad has the potential to wither away if Cubans move from their Spanish-speaking 
ethnic enclave and intermarry with non-Hispanics. 
Conclusion
Cuban-American assimilation has proven incomparable among other Hispanic 
subgroups. High Cuban-American assimilation is not merely due to higher economic 
conditions but to a unique history, unmatched by any other immigrant group. They were 
skilled, mobilized, and supported by the U.S. government, which allowed for a thriving 
enclave in Miami to develop. Clearly, Cuban Americans had benefits over other 
immigrants that propelled them to alter the financial, social, cultural and political makeup 
of Miami. Their historical reason for migration was embedded in an international conflict 
between capitalism and communism. Their successful adaptation was a byproduct of the 
availability of specialized resources sponsored by the U.S. government, reinforced by the 
presence of an ethnic enclave. In Miami, there are Cubans and there are Cubans; meaning 
each wave differed sharply between the resources available to them at the time of arrival. 
The first and second-wave immigrants came with higher levels of education that 
gave them better opportunities to integrate into the labor market. The extensive enclave 
created by immigrants in Miami made a wide range of services and employment 
39
Bueso: Cubans: Anomaly or Pioneers?
Published by Rollins Scholarship Online, 2010
opportunities available for third and fourth-wavers as well. Furthermore, 94 percent of 
Cubans speak English well or very well and Cubans have the highest rate of Hispanic 
intermarriage. 
Cubans may live in enclaves that preserve bilingualism, their conservative 
religious views and strict foreign policy, but it does not mean that they are incapable of 
sharing the American Dream. In fact, they adapted to the American mainstream quicker 
than any other Hispanic immigrant group as is evident by their education, language and 
intermarriage trends. Their unique assimilation trend and mobilization contributed to 
greater political incorporation and influence in American politics that has been seen in 
the past thirty years. First-generation cohorts, partake in American organizations 
fundamental to civil society at disproportionately greater rates than do the archetypal 
fourth-wave laborers. 
Thus, as assimilation rates for first and second-wave cohorts (and their children) 
are greater, so is the level of their political incorporation. My next chapter studies the 
degree to which this incorporation takes place in the political arena, and what were the 
predominant vehicles used by the Cuban-American community to become politically 
integrated. To a certain extent, the natural extension of this political integration is also 
studied, namely, what is the effect of political concentration of power. The concentration 
of power is viewed from both the Cuban-American perspective and that of the American 
government. The former is studied in order to see what choices have been made by 
Cuban Americans and what these choices signify, and the latter is analyzed in order to 
attempt to derive some recommendations for obtaining greater inclusion by Hispanics in 
general in the American political arena.  The assumption underlying the analysis is that 
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with assimilation comes a higher degree of participation in the political process. This 
seemingly innocuous premise is tested and vetted in chapters two and three.
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“Here in Miami, Cuba both lives and is reborn everyday,
just like the sun, in its exiled children.”
- Rene Silva, quoted in The Exile, 1993
CHAPTER TWO: Enclaves, Support and Political Incorporation 
I have established that Cubans, more so than other Latinos and at a faster rate than 
non-Hispanic Whites, are well educated, maintain their native tongue as well as learn 
English, and demonstrate increasing tendencies to intermarry. This is only one 
component of being a political viable and important voting bloc. In addition to their 
assimilation, Cubans are more politically incorporated than other Hispanics. Scholars 
have yet to agree upon a firm definition of political incorporation but recognize the value 
of certain factors. The mechanisms of participation, the availability of civic institutions, 
citizenship, mass mobilization, influence over policy agenda, and representation through 
elected officials, are all staples of the undefined concept.53
In this chapter, I will show that Cuban American political incorporation, 
measured by their unusually high rate of naturalization, voter registration and voter-
turnout, is a byproduct of at least three factors: 1) the presence of a true ethnic enclave 
that facilitates in the economic adjustment process; 2) many Cubans left the island as 
political refugees as opposed to economic refugees and were already politically 
motivated and mobilized around a cause; and 3) they came to the United States with rapid 
access to residency, and thus eventual citizenship.  To prove this via measurement, I 
                                                
53 Janelle Wong, “Thinking About Immigrant Political Incorporation,” Maxwell School of Syracuse 
University Campbell Public Affairs Institute, December 6, 2002, available at: 
http://www.maxwell.syr.edu/moynihan/programs/iiwg/pdfs/Wong.pdf
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compile research on naturalization rates, voter turnout and the availability of PACS as 
well as the monetary amounts donated over time. My aim is to connect their higher rates 
of assimilation and incorporation to greater political influence.
Cubans have been stereotypically defined by their right-wing political preferences 
and staunch anti-Castro sentiments. While this may be valid for first-wave exiles, aging 
to fifty and above, it is not necessarily the case among all Cubans, especially second-
generation American-born Cubans. Sixty percent of the country’s 1.24 million Cubans 
reside in Miami-Dade and Broward counties.54 Among the Cubans in the United States, 
37 percent were born in the U.S. Among the foreign born, 30 percent entered before 
1980, 12 percent entered between 1980 and 1990, and 21 percent entered after 1990.55 A 
large amount of the foreign-born entered before 1980 and appeared to originally resist 
surrendering their citizenship because of motivations to return to their home island. As 
the U.S.-Cuban embargo stretched to over fifty years, however, Cuban refugees 
established homes, families, businesses and new lives in South Florida. The hope of 
returning to their vivacious island wearing white linen guayaberas with bongos beating in 
the background dwindled. This ethnic group is particularly interesting because of their 
unusually high political incorporation in comparison with other ethnic groups and their 
subsequent electoral behavior. 
In this chapter, I will show a correlation between the increase in Cuban-American 
naturalization rates and their political influence. By the 1980s not only did Miami have 
several Cuban mayors but there were ten Cuban-American state legislatures and by the 
                                                
54 Guillermo Grenier, “Anti-Castro Political Ideology among Cuban-Americans in the Miami Area: Cohort 
and Generational Differences,” Latino Research, Vol. 2 No 1, November 2004, p. 1.
55 “Cubans in the United States,” Pew Hispanic Center, August 25, 2006, p. 3.
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1990s, with the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF) at its side, significant 
policy changes were brewing in Washington, D.C. 
Naturalization and Voter Turnout
The Latino population is too important and more recently, politically influential, 
for scholars alone to study. The role of Cuban intellectuals, public officials and 
entrepreneurs has grown in the last forty years, increasing the group’s political clout. 
Much of this influence stemmed from their high rate of naturalization.
Nationally, over 40 percent of the Hispanic population was foreign-born in 1994, 
yet only 18 percent of those are naturalized.56 While 15 percent of Mexicans are 
naturalized, 20 percent of Dominicans and El Salvadorians are also naturalized, Cubans 
are an anomaly – over 50 percent of foreign-born Cubans in the United States are 
naturalized, allowing them to flex more political might than other Latino subgroups. This 
high rate of naturalization is a reflection of the special benefits given to Cubans upon 
entrance to the U.S. They were granted almost immediate access to citizenship and 
because Cuban Americans reside in concentrated area, their political impact is magnified. 
This also makes Cuban Americans more attractive to election candidates looking for the 
most potential votes with the least effort. Other Hispanic subgroups require more than 
simple get-out-the-vote type campaigns but also movements to naturalize these 
populations. 
Allow me to preface my argument by stating that I make the assumption that 
increased assimilation is a sufficient condition for increased political influence. For 
                                                
56 Susana Baker Gonzalez, “Su Voto Es Su Voz: Latino Political Empowerment and the Immigration 
Challenge,” PS: Political Science and Politics, Vol. 29, No. 3, (Sept., 1996), pp. 465-468.
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example, scholars have argued that low voter turnout amongst the Latin population is 
present due to language barriers, low levels of education and attempts to exclude Latinos 
from society. California, Texas and Florida each respectively rank the highest for foreign-
born populations yet Florida operates much differently. The immense Cuban enclaves 
made political incorporation possible and transformed Florida culturally, socially, and 
economically. Cubans are empowered in the U.S. and particularly South Florida to 
become citizens, to vote, and to donate to PACS. Furthermore, many Cuban immigrants 
may realize the civil liberties that were withheld in Cuba and set to utilize those newly 
found freedoms in the United States. The rate at which Cubans become citizens is 
important because it serves as a barometer of their willingness to integrate in the host 
country and measures their potential political power. 
All U.S. government administrations since the Kennedy era made large efforts to 
distribute Cuban refugees across the country, but despite their efforts, Cubans largely 
settled in Miami, Florida.57 In 1970, 40 percent of Cuban Americans lived in Miami, in 
1980 that figure jumped to 52 percent and by 2000 the figure was well over 60 percent, 
constituting the largest voting bloc in Miami.58 Research by Alejandro Portes indicates 
that Cuban naturalization exceeds that of all other immigrant groups except Asia and is 
one factor explaining their political influence. In the 1970s, Cuban naturalizations more 
than doubled that of the rest of Latin America and Western Europe. Furthermore, 
immigrants typically follow a seven year transition period before changing nationalities. 
Latin Americans, with the exception of Cubans, peak later than other immigrant groups. 
                                                
57 Jose Llanes, Cuban Americans: Masters of Survival (Cambridge: Abt Books, 1982), pp. 33, 37.
58Alejandro Portes and Rafael Mozo, “The Political Adaptation Process of Cubans and Other Ethnic 
Minorities in the United States: A Preliminary Analysis,” International Migration Review, Vol.19, No. 1, 
Spring 1985, pp. 35-63.
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Cubans are consistent with other cohorts because of their reason for departure, advanced 
educational background, and distance from country of origin.59 While it is typical for 
those emigrating from countries closer in proximity to withhold their citizenship longer, 
Cubans emigrated for political purposes, offsetting the proximity factor. 
The realization by Cubans of their meek chances of return and better opportunities 
in the United States, led to higher rates of naturalization. Couple this with the fact that 
during the decades of the 1960s and 1970s, they were practically assured en-masse 
acceptance. Further add to this the almost immediate granting of legal status of 137,500 
refugees from the Mariel Boatlift influx in 1980, ironically, about a month after the 1980 
Census took place. The émigrés had nowhere to go and nowhere to return to. This factor, 
I believe, speeds up naturalization. At the same time, naturalization is more difficult 
when immigrants have options and choices in life other than seeking refuge in a new 
country. 
Portes found that nationalities sending more immigrants experienced higher rates 
of naturalization; those who emigrated for political purposes became citizens at a rate 13 
percent higher than immigrants who came for economic reasons.60 Educational 
background also contributes to Cubans’ higher rate of naturalization since, for example, 
each additional percent of college graduates in 1970 rendered a 1.5 percent increase in 
naturalization ten years later. 
South Florida has the greatest proportion of foreign-born in the state and by 1995 
three out of five Miamians were naturalized, suggesting that many first and second-wave 
                                                
59 Portes and Mozo, “The Political Adaptation,” pp. 35-63.
60 Portes and Mozo, “The Political Adaptation,” pp. 35-63.
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Cuban immigrants became citizens.61 A study complete by Lisa Montoya, a professor at 
the University of Texas at Austin, found after considering several variables that only two 
were significant in mobilizing the Cuban sector: organizational participation and solving 
neighborhood problems. The established enclave in South Florida provided associational 
links and skills that actually promoted participation. Elderly Cubans had yet to become 
citizens in the 1990s for two reasons: their lack of proficiency in English and their age 
that limits group connectedness and thus reduces political involvement.62
Table 7: Naturalization Rate Among Cuban Americans in Miami-Dade
Miami-Dade County 1980 1990 2000
Cuban Naturalization Rate 48 percent 47.2 percent 50+ percent
Naturalization varies by income, education, and age of entry among other factors. 
While important, is not as good of a gauge of adaptation to the American political system 
as registration and voter turnout in elections. Hispanics as a whole have been criticized 
for low naturalization, registration and voting rates, “Mexican naturalization was either 
the lowest or among the lowest of all immigrants groups.”63 And a New York Times/CBS 
poll found that “in 2003, 23 percent of Hispanic immigrants were citizens, compared to 
69 percent of non-Hispanic immigrants.64 One suggestion for their lack of naturalization 
                                                
61 Leon Bouvier, William Leonard and John Martin, “Shaping Florida: The Effects of Immigration, 1970-
2020,” Center for Immigration Studies, Center Report, December 1995. 
62 Lisa Montoya, “Gender and Citizenship in Latino Political Participation,” Latinos; Remaking America
(Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2002), pp. 410-427.
63 Portes and Mozo, “The Political Adaptation,” p. 40. 
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is that many live in the country illegally. Cuban Americans, however, do not fit this 
pattern.  
Unfortunately, the U.S. Census Bureau does not disaggregate Spanish-origin 
registration and turnout rate based on national origin. To navigate around this setback, I 
follow an approach used by Alejandro Portes, who analyzes Miami-Dade County 
Hispanics. Census Bureau data reports that Latinos registration and voting is less than the 
non-Hispanic average. They do not, however, account for citizenship which is a 
significant factor in Miami considering the number of Latinos ineligible for citizenship. 
Portes thus adjusts the electoral data to include only U.S. citizens of voting age and finds 
that Latinos in Miami actually vote in greater proportion than do whites and blacks.65
Recognizing that Cuban Americans represent 70 percent of Spanish-origin residents in 
Miami and over 90 percent of the naturalized Hispanics in Miami, it can be inferred that 
Cuban Americans in Miami demonstrate higher than the national average electoral 
participation.  
Hispanics in Miami show more political involvement than Hispanics nationwide. 
Highlighting Spanish-origin electorate concentrates, the census data demonstrates that 
electoral participation in these regions is significantly higher than national averages. 
More so than other Latinos, Cubans share a strong preference with the Anglo community 
that activism can be used to accomplish specific goals. They are issue oriented and 
support candidates who profess strong anti-Castro sentiments. Keep in mind, however, 
that the children of exiled Cubans are American citizens by birth. I have belabored the 
point that the dynamics of an ethnic enclave made it easier for Cuban immigrants to 
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become incorporated into the labor market and hence society. But what about their 
children?
Second-generation Cuban Americans differ from one another according to when 
their parents arrived on the island, creating distinct differences among their offspring. 
Portes suggests that Cuban parents used social resources to facilitate their agenda of 
ensuring upward social mobility for their children and avoiding downward assimilation. 
Take for example the establishment of bilingual private schools, taught mostly by first-
generation immigrants that reinforced the values of their parents. This type of education 
allows anti-Castro sentiments to prosper and generates greater support for candidates who 
espouse harsh anticommunist beliefs. 
What is of vast importance is that Hispanics are growing in numbers and 
reshaping American politics. It is therefore more important than ever to study how they 
engage in national politics and what issues mobilize the group. 
Political Action Committees and Campaign Donations
While there are only three Cuban-American PACs known, between 1989 and 
2000 they donated $753,524, 58 percent of which went to Democrats and 42 percent to 
Republicans.66  Second only behind the Jewish lobby, the Cuban-American PAC, the 
Cuban American Coalition Inc., and the Free Cuba PAC can boast the power to spread 
their influence between parties, guide large vote populations to support specific 
candidates and polices, and use their power to mobilize key constituents that are 
geographically concentrated in areas that impact the outcome of elections.  The extent of 
                                                
66 “The Cuban Connection,” Open Secrets, 23 Feb. 2007. available at: 
opensecrets.org/pubs/cubareport/summary.asp.
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these powers will be detailed with an emphasis on the passage of the 1992 Cuban 
Democracy Act and the 1996 Helms-Burton Act. 
Before exposing how Cuban Americans guide legislation it is important to reveal 
the extent to which Cubans are financially incorporated. Earlier in the chapter it was 
made clear that the majority of Cubans are naturalized, registered and mobilized, but to 
what degree are they involved in the American campaign finance maelstrom?
Cubans rank a very distant second in terms of campaign donations among all 
ethnic interest groups with $754,000 compared to the donation leader pro-Israel PACs 
that donated $16.8 million in the last decade.67 While Cubans are obviously limited in 
financial power compared to pro-Israeli PACs, they have still created a large network of 
influence and power related to pressing pro-embargo issues in Congress. Much of the 
financial support comes from wealthy first and second-wave families as opposed to more 
recent immigrants who immigrated for economic purposes. Thus the focus of the PACs 
has been to weaken Castro’s regime by strengthening the embargo. 
The amount donated to the two main parties is significant because, although 
assumed to be a strong Republican voting bloc, the majority of donations were given to 
Democratic candidates. Interestingly, Cuban Americans vote in favor of Republican 
candidates more often than Democrats. This division can be attributed to the top two 
Cuban donors who contributed 26 percent of all Democratic donations. Nearly half of all 
money from Hispanics is generated by Cubans who represent 43 percent of the Hispanic 
population in Florida. Of these donors, in 1979-2000, 56-60 percent of all contributions 
were to Democratic candidates or parties. Their donations reached a peak in the 1990s 
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when Cuban-American foreign policy legislation was at its post-Bay of Pigs high mark.68
This breakdown is highlighted in Figure 1. 
Differences between congressional and presidential elections do alter the balance 
between which party generates the largest contributions. Among congressional 
candidates, 56 percent of contributions went to Democratic candidates ($1.8 million) and 
44 percent to Republicans ($1.4 million). Conversely, in presidential elections, 69 percent 
was given to Republican candidates ($436,866) and only 31 percent to Democratic 
candidates ($196,800), derived from individuals rather than PACs.69
Figure 1: To Democrats $4,317,148
  To Republicans $2,904,391
  To Third Parties $25,750
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Hoping to exert more influence collectively rather than individually, the Free 
Cuba PAC generated approximately $1.7 million between its inception and in 2000. The 
organization supported candidates nation-wide who were anti-Castro, pro-embargo and 
attempted to defeat anti-embargo candidates. The foundation became so influential that 
by 1997 the Center for Public Integrity named it the most effective lobby in America.70
The more than 170 directors of the PAC each donated between $1,000 and $6,500 
annually and about 55,000 members contributed $100 per year.71
While they were not the only organization, few others could buy as much political 
influence as CANF between 1989 and 2000. Thus 99 percent of Cuban-American 
contributions went to the Free Cuba PAC.72 After the death of the infamous CANF 
leader, Jorge Mas Canosa, and the succession of his son with vastly different ideas, the 
Foundation’s conservative supporters disappeared. In 2001 a faction split off and formed 
the Cuba Liberty Council, maintaining ties to the Bush family and the original 
conservative base. CANF still exists and remains anti-Castro but has changed its strategy 
in dealing with Cuban foreign policy. Instead, the foundation began to support new 
immigrant concerns. 
By 2004 another PAC out shadowed the organization and collected over $500,000 
in one year, the U.S.-Cuba Democracy PAC. This organization also targeted pro-embargo 
candidates and funded 75 congressional candidates successfully. Their influence 
generated foreign policy changes such as the 2005 decision to reverse the congressional 
move to permit freedom of travel. The organization was issue oriented and thus non 
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partisan, supporting all those who favored tightening the embargo, including more 
Democrats than Republicans. It is important to note that the largest political donors 
contributed directly to candidates and political parties as opposed to funding their 
agendas indirectly through PACS, building their personal capital (one donor received an 
ambassadorship).73
While the different waves of immigrants are divided based on date of arrival, 
economic class, and U.S. versus foreign born, the great majority agree on their sentiments 
toward Castro. The political positions taken by the Free Cuba PAC and the U.S.-Cuba 
Democracy PAC are explainable by exposing the donors. First and second-waves of 
Cuban immigrants came from the upper echelon of Cuban societies; they were given a 
wealth of resources provided by Washington to ease their integration into American 
society. Thus, they were given aid, training, and job placement so that the government 
could use them in their Cold War battles. The more recent arrivals were not offered the 
same benefits and thus struggled to enter a saturated market. Furthermore, first and 
second-wave Cubans favor more harsh policies toward Cuba, while more recent 
immigrants moved to the U.S. for economic reasons and are concerned with helping 
family they may have left behind. It was the wealthy upper and middle-class Cubans that 
donated to PACs, thus guiding the tough pro-embargo preferences. 
Those who dominate the political field in South Florida are émigrés of the first 
and second-waves or children of this cohort. Nationally only 26 percent of fourth-wave 
immigrants were naturalized compared to 92 percent of first-wave immigrants.74 This 
data follows a pattern more generally. Fourth-wave immigrants are less educated and 
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poorer than the older immigrants, representing a class that is typically disenfranchised 
and show low voter-participation rates. Political incorporation locally is not as critical for 
these immigrants because of their continual ties to Cuba, and their politically alienated 
feelings, which divides them from first-wave immigrants. They share a dislike for the 
Castro regime but are conflicted with foreign policy ideas because of their ties to family.
Thus the first wave’s economic and hence political hegemony results in the skewed views 
and policies for Cubans nationwide. 
In fact, research conducted by Guillermo Grenier and Florida International 
University concluded that the Cuban community is not as monolithically conservative as 
they appear.75 While most are anti-Castro, the degree to which they are varies across 
cohorts.  First-wave immigrants consider the embargo as one of the most important 
policies to deprive the island of U.S. dollars, while recent immigrants have found allies in 
Congress attempting to loosen the embargo, since it contributes to the poor economic 
condition of the country and ultimately hurts the people as opposed to Castro. 
Influence on Foreign Policy
A few acts in the 1990s demonstrate the powerful political influence of Cuban 
PACs despite the fact that Cuban Americans only represent 1 percent of the entire U.S.
population. Politicians obviously favor those who support them financially and at the 
voting booths. The Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 and the Helms-Burton Act of 1996 
were passed due to the large financial influence of CANF. Behind these two pieces of 
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legislation there was an emotional cohesion among supporters and a single-issue focus; 
they wanted to secure foreign policy to weaken the Castro regime via further sanctions. 
Historically, the U.S./Cuba embargo was enacted for political reasons. Castro 
nationalized American properties, he aligned with the Soviet Union, and general fears of 
the spread of communism guided support for the embargo. Immediately, other Latin 
American countries followed suit and enacted their own sanctions against Cuba. By 1975, 
however, most countries began to revisit their sanctions and reestablish trade with the 
country.76 In the case of the Cuban Democracy Act, Cubans Americans financially 
supported the author of the act, Robert Torricelli (D-NJ), who raised $399,000 from 
Florida Cubans. Clearly aware of the voting power of Cuban Americans (Union City, 
New Jersey has the second largest population of Cubans in the country) his legislative 
initiatives are evidence of this understanding. Similarly, Bob Graham (D-FL) the co-
sponsor of the act, received $139,000 in his Senate campaigns and is the sixth largest 
recipient of Cuban-American contributions.77 The act sought to “promote a peaceful 
transition to democracy in Cuba through the application of appropriate pressures on the 
Cuban Government and support for the Cuban people.”78 Thus, the act forbade U.S.
companies from doing business in Cuba, outlawed family remittances to Cuba and 
banned citizens from traveling to the country. 
Although President Bush 41 was originally opposed to the bill, presidential 
candidate Bill Clinton’s visit to Little Havana to voice support for the bill quickly 
changed the president’s mind. Instead, President Bush signed the bill after learning of 
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Jorge Mas Canosa’s (President of CANF) meetings with Clinton and their preparation to 
make a deal.79
Cuban influence in national politics can be seen again a few years later with the 
Helms-Burton Act, when Cuban Americans fought head to head with business interests. 
After two Brothers-to-the-Rescue aircrafts were shot down by the Cuban military, Cuban 
Americans were again mobilized around tightening restrictions against Cuba. This Act 
caught international attention as the bill allowed U.S. citizens to sue foreign investors 
developing and using American property seized by Castro’s government. It also 
mandated that investors be denied entry visas to the U.S. The international community 
became embroiled in a debate as to whether the Act violated their sovereignty and trading 
rights, as well as GATT and WTO rules. 
The controversial components of the bill are typically referred to as Title III. 
Despite objections from businesses and the international community, this bill represents 
an enormous feat for CANF, which lobbied and pressured Washington into passing the 
bill.80 Since its inception Presidents Clinton and Bush 43 have suspended Title III 
annually to appease the international community. Interestingly, the authors of the bill, 
while staunch conservatives, received no monetary support from Cuban Americans until 
after 1990. Burton received $61,000 and Helms $86,000.81 Furthermore, since 1996, after 
the bill’s passage, neither congressman has received campaign contributions from Cuban 
PACs. 
The legislation is evidence of CANF’s bipartisan support. It was written by two 
Republicans, supported by Democrats and Republicans alike, and signed by a Democratic 
                                                
79 “The Cuban Connection.”
80 “The Cuban Connection.”
81 “The Cuban Connection.”
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president, all of them were supported financially by the Cuban-American community. 
The top recipients of Cuban American funds are Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL, $289,000), 
Robert Menendez (D-NJ, $240,000) and Lincoln Diaz-Balart (R-FL, $204,000). 
Conclusion
Cuban-American political involvement thus shows a positive trend with increases 
in naturalization, voter turnout and the political activity of PACS. This activism is due in 
part to their established enclave. As Cuban refugees were given immediate access to 
resident benefits and citizenship they were drawn into the political process. Other 
Hispanic immigrants are not granted such benefits and are thus ostracized from the 
process from the onset. More recent Cuban immigrants in Miami look to the earlier 
waves as examples of civic leadership and are more inclined to participate. Many 
immigrant communities feel disenfranchised from the politics. However, as Cuban 
Democracy Act and Helms-Burton Act 
demonstrated, Cubans have influence 
over areas of their concern, mainly 
foreign policy directed at Cuba.
 Furthermore, as an entire 
community becomes politically active, 
as Cuban American votes increase, and 
as Cuban Americans become elected 
representatives, their activism and voices 
become larger. The Cuban community in 
Figure 2: From Federation for American 
Immigration and Reform
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the last thirty years has proven to be a viable voting bloc. Presidential and congressional 
candidates unfamiliar with the Cuban Diaspora must consider and increasingly study 
their voting behavior, especially taking into account the intense competition for Florida in 
the past few elections. This should include a concern for all Hispanics as well as they 
become more assimilated and eventually political enfranchised. 
Depending on immigration policies, the adoption of a guest workers program and 
the increase in legal immigration versus policies for immigration stability, the Federation 
for American Immigration Reform estimated that by 2050 the population of Florida will 
range between 24 and over 33 million people, as shown in Figure 2. Assuming no change 
in policy, the population will increase from 17 million to approximately 31.5 million, a 
76 percent increase.82 In South Florida, a greater proportion of new residents will be of 
Hispanic origin. This is incredibly significant for candidates considering running for 
political office. If the population of Florida continues to follow the trend from 1990-
2000, the U.S. Census Bureau shows a 36 percent increase in 2025, representing the 
fourth fastest rate in the country.  
As the Hispanic community grows, perhaps the Cubans can serve as role models 
for other Latinos, demonstrating the importance civic participation. Cuban-American 
incorporation is not due merely to higher economic conditions but to a unique history, 
unparalleled by any other immigrant group. They were skilled, mobilized and developed 
a community in Miami that fostered and facilitated a thriving enclave of successful 
Cubans. Their political roots in their home country prompted a journey of political 
incorporation in the U.S., and the support from the U.S. government encouraged 
                                                
82 Florida: Census Bureau Data. Federation for American Immigration and Reform, available at: 
http://www.fairus.org/site/PageServer?pagename=research_researchd184
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participation in the American system. Cubans are citizens, they are registered and they 
vote at higher rates than any other Hispanic group and any other voting bloc in Miami. 
The extent of Cuban-American’s political influence will be discussed further in the 
following chapter, including a comparison to other Hispanic groups, but it is imperative 
to note that Cuban political incorporation is unmatched among other Hispanic immigrants 
and greater due to high assimilation rates. 
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“The vote is a trust more delicate than any other,
for it involves not just the interests of the voter,
but his life, honor and future as well.”
- Jose Marti
CHAPTER THREE: Anomaly or Pioneers?
In his recent book, Who Are We?, Samuel Huntington, a noted political scientist 
who teaches at Harvard, claims that increased Hispanic immigration to the United States 
is eroding traditional American values.83 He assumes --questionably-- that the 
maintenance of immigrants’ cultural values inhibits their ability to share the American 
Dream. As demonstrated in previous chapters, Cubans are assimilating and taking 
ownership of the American Dream that many aim to protect. Cuban Americans may live 
in enclaves of Spanish-speaking residents and generally maintain their Catholic beliefs,
but they also contribute enormously to the financial, social, cultural, and more 
importantly for the argument in this thesis, political aspects of society. As was shown in 
the last chapter, Cuban Americans, unlike other Hispanic groups, became a part of the 
political process through registering in large numbers, high turnout in elections, 
influencing foreign policy and mobilizing fellow Latinos in Miami. The question 
remains, can their experience be shared by other Hispanic immigrant groups, or are 
Cubans unique? 
                                                
83Samuel Huntington, Who Are We? (New York: Simon and Schuster Paperbacks, 2004), p. 221. 
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By 2000, Cuban-American owned businesses in the U.S. generated more revenue 
than the entire GDP of the Cuban island.84 Cuban Americans not only do well 
economically but have integrated themselves into core organizations Americans consider 
fundamental to democracy, such as Municipios de Cuba en el Exilio, The Liga Contra el 
Cancer, Kiwanis Clubs, Cuban American Chambers of Commerce, and Rotary 
International. Not only are their electoral participation rates high, but Cuban Americans 
have begun to gain high positions in politics. Nationally, 53 percent of Cuban Americans 
have U.S. citizenship compared to 29 percent of Mexican Latinos.85 Of the 53 percent of 
Cubans who are naturalized citizens, a survey conducted by Florida International 
University in 2004 found that 90 percent are registered voters.86
Aside from the electorate, Cuban Americans dominate the political realm in 
Miami-Dade County, holding more than one third of the top appointed positions. This 
trend began in the 1980s, and by 2004 there were three Cuban-American congressmen 
and one U.S. senator. Reagan was the first president to capitalize the Cuban vote when he 
supported the formation of the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF) in 1981. 
Gaining political influence and the ability to reach large masses of Cubans, the 
organization formed a lobby organization, the Cuban American Foundation, and a PAC, 
the Free Cuba PAC. 
If the 2000 election was valuable at all, it demonstrated the importance of Florida 
politics and how critical the Cuban-American vote is in presidential elections. President 
Bush 43 was overwhelmingly supported by Cuban Americans, 85 percent of whom voted 
                                                
84 Susan Eckstein, “Cuban Émigrés and the American Dream,” Political Science and Politics, June 2006, 
Vol. 4/ No. 2, p. 297.
85 Eckstein, “Cuban Emigres,” p. 299.
86 Eckstein, “Cuban Emigres,” p. 299.
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for him, while the media criticized Al Gore for his weak effort to court Hispanics in 
South Florida. Whether it was a reward for their support, a move to gain more Cuban 
support in future elections, or a genuine effort to include Cuban Americans in the 
political arena, thus furthering their assimilation into American politics and culture, Bush 
appointed several Cuban Americans to high-ranking positions in his administration, 
including the National Security Council, State Department and Department of Housing 
and Urban Development. Can other Hispanics follow suit?
This chapter will compare the Cuban-American experience with that of two other 
Hispanic groups, Mexican Americans and Nicaraguan Americans. I chose Mexicans 
because, as the largest Hispanic ethnic group, they suffer from political disorganization, 
infighting and cause much of the current immigration debates. I discuss whether this 
group has the potential to experience social advancement and political inclusion or 
whether they will be an ostracized racial minority group. The Nicaraguan case was 
chosen because, like the Cuban Americans, they experienced a communist-led revolution
that sent thousands of exiles to the U.S. By comparing Nicaraguans, whose immigration 
conditions were similar to Cuban Americans, I can examine the possibility of 
convergence among Hispanic groups. If the Nicaraguan experience paralleled that of 
Cuban Americans, then perhaps Cubans are not an anomaly after all. The conclusion 
summarizes the significant findings and explains the effects of immigrant assimilation on 
political incorporation. 
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Case Study: Cubans and Mexican Americans
Immigrants are undergoing a segmented assimilation process that differs for each 
ethnic group. While the Cuban Diaspora can not be matched exactly, some Hispanic 
subgroups will experience fast integration into the American mainstream by virtue of 
their environment -- if they migrate to areas of the U.S. with lower populations of 
Hispanics and little network support, assimilation will be more rapid. If, however, they 
move to urban centers with high concentrations of Hispanics in already established 
enclaves, assimilation will take a different form. German immigrants, for instance, were 
able to sustain their culture in the Midwest pre-WWI, while Italians in the northeast
experienced a two-generation transition to becoming Americanized.87
As Alejandro Portes and Ruben Rumbaut note, the rate of assimilation depends on 
four factors: 1) the history of the immigrant group including its human capital and reason 
for departure; 2) the cultural and economic barriers confronted by immigrants in the host 
country; 3) the family and community resources available upon arrival; and 4) the 
differential pace of acculturation based on language skills.88
The “Golden Enclave” or first-wave Cuban immigrants were the original 
pioneers. They created social capital or a springboard, if you will, for their offspring and 
the following waves of Cubans, preventing the possibility of downward assimilation. The 
establishment of a network of private schools allowed for American-born Cuban children 
                                                
87 Richard Alba, “Language Assimilation Today: Bilingualism Persists More than in the Past, But English 
Still Dominates,” Lewis Mumford Center for Comparative Urban and Regional Research, University of 
Albany, December 2004.
88 Ruben Rumbaut and Alejandro Portes, Ethnicities: Children of Immigrants in America (Los Angeles: 
University of California Press 2001), pp. 301-315.
63
Bueso: Cubans: Anomaly or Pioneers?
Published by Rollins Scholarship Online, 2010
to maintain their bilingualism, protecting them against outside discrimination and 
reinforcing the values of their parents.89
Compare the Cuban experience to the largest Hispanic immigrant group in the 
nation, Mexicans, and a different conclusion can be drawn. Mexicans have greater 
difficulties assimilating because of three reasons: 1) they take up residence near the 
Mexican border; 2) many immigrants continue a back and forth migration pattern; and 3) 
their immigrant status and language barriers ensure that a large number of them do not 
integrate economically and professionally, suggesting that they work in marginal jobs in
the agricultural sector and are unable to assimilate to mainstream America. In Who Are 
We?, Huntington based his projection of “a culturally bifurcated Anglo-Hispanic society 
with two national languages” on the experiences of Mexican Americans.90
European immigrants were dispersed throughout the country and, while the U.S.
tried to do so with Cubans, Hispanics have remained largely in concentrated enclaves: 
Cubans in Miami, Mexicans in Southern California and Texas, and Dominicans and 
Puerto Ricans in New York. Furthermore, the Hispanic fertility rates (3.0) are higher than 
those of blacks (2.1) and non-Hispanic Whites (1.8).91 Cuban fertility rates are closer to 
non-Hispanics whites than Hispanics. As concluded earlier, assimilation is slowed when 
immigrants live in highly concentrated enclaves as Mexicans do. The U.S., however, has 
not dealt with the massive immigration streams it is now experiencing since European 
immigration in 1880-1920. 
                                                
89 Lisandro, Perez, “Growing Up Cuban in Miami,” in Ruben Rumbaut and Alejandro Portes, Ethnicities: 
Children of Immigrants in America (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2001), pp. 96-108.
90 Samuel Huntington, Who Are We? (New York: Simon and Schuster Paperbacks, 2004), pp. 221-256. 
91 Huntington, Who Are We?, pp. 221-256
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The problem the U.S. now faces with Hispanic immigration is threefold. First, 
migration is contagious -- “a migration flow, once begun, induces its own flow.” 92
Migration is easier for subsequent groups because friends and family are informed about 
the process, are exposed to more resources and often have more job opportunities in the 
host country. Second, it is politically difficult to cease continuous flows of migration 
after the immigrant group has organized politically. For example, Cuban Americans 
quickly became politically incorporated by naturalizing, registering to vote and creating 
PACs. Doing so allowed them to mobilize and lobby in Washington to achieve specific 
foreign policy goals. And third, enclaves make it harder for immigrant groups to 
assimilate because, within them, group members do not need to learn the host language to 
compete for jobs or survive. Immigrants create a network of support that allows them to 
maintain cultural pride, much as Mexican Americans currently experience. 
Unlike previous Europeans immigrants, Mexican Americans, like Cuban 
Americans, take pride in maintaining their Spanish language as well as learning English. 
“There appears to be a cultural difference among Asian and Hispanic parents with respect 
to having their children maintain their native language.”93 Mexican-American education 
levels, however, pale in comparison with those of Cuban Americans. Forty-one percent 
of fourth-generation Mexican Americans still lack a high school degree and the 
“proportion of Hispanic high-school graduates who had ever enrolled in college was 
much lower in 1990 than in 1973.”94 Mexican Americans are thus an example of 
downward assimilation, in which subsequent generations have lower education, income 
                                                
92 Myron Weiner, The Global Migration Crisis: Challenge to States and Human Rights (New York: Harper 
Collins, 2005). 
93 Peter Skerry, “Mexican Americans: The Ambivalent Minority” (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1993), pp. 286, 289. 
94 Huntington, Who Are We?, pp. 221-256.
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and social levels than their parents. This is an extreme example of the poverty trap 
experienced by all new immigrants.  How quickly they can escape this trap historically 
varies between immigrants across history.
Mexican Americans (66.9 percent) are also disproportionately more likely to 
work in low socioeconomic jobs such as busboys and laborers than Cubans (25.8 percent
of those in public school and 7.7 percent of those in private school) and other Hispanic 
immigrants.95 Can they experience economic upward mobility as Cuban Americans
have? Scholars have noted that immigrant groups experiencing economic success in the 
U.S. have similar successes in their birth country. Few Mexican-Americans immigrants 
to the U.S., however, were economically successful in their home country. Furthermore, 
fourth-generation Mexican Americans have made little improvements over second-
generation Mexicans. Thus their stagnancy in education and social status leads one to 
believe that they will not experience the same assimilation pattern as Cuban Americans 
and will remain in low socioeconomic status. This is not to say that no Mexican 
American will achieve upward mobility and greater educational and social status; as a 
group, however, they may not. 
Be reminded that Mexican naturalization rates, 29 percent, were also the lowest 
among all immigrant groups. While identity was not a variable calculated in previous 
chapters, due mainly to the difficulty in measuring such an arbitrary element, Huntington 
discusses the extent to which Mexican Americans identify with the United States. Cuban 
Americans overwhelmingly describe themselves as “White” and “American,” whereas 
                                                
95 Patricia Fernandez Kelly and Richard Schauffler, “Divided Fates: Immigrant Children and the New 
Assimilation,” in Alejandro Portes, The New Second Generation (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 
1996), p. 48. 
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Mexicans primarily identify as “Mexican.”96 Moreover, he noted that over a three-
generation model, Mexicans are less likely to identify with core American values than 
foreign-born and less likely to agree that everyone should learn English! This is an 
incredible discovery. Despite living in the U.S., Mexicans, unlike Cuban Americans, 
have much more difficulty in adopting the American Dream as their own, especially as 
some experience downward assimilation. Subsequent Mexican-American generations 
reject American culture and society that has often ignored them and instead embrace an 
immigrant mentality that is difficult to overcome. 
This rejection of American values may relate to a dark history when the U.S. 
conquered parts of Mexico, dating back to the secession of territories later known as 
Texas, and the acquisition of California, New Mexico, and Arizona. There may also be a 
color-line preventing their assimilation. Mexicans are of Indian origin and are born with a 
darker skin color, making them visually different from Anglos. First and second-wave 
Cubans, on the other hand, are light skinned and can blend much easier with Americans. 
The highly concentrated Cuban population in Miami transformed the once retiree-
filled city into a bustling economic center. And these Cubans are different from Mexicans 
because Cubans had the skill sets to develop an enclave in which they could thrive by 
dominating the political realm, banking, economics, entertainment, etc. They 
Americanized easily because they were educated, wealthy, spoke both English and 
Spanish, and intermarried with non-Hispanic Whites. Mexicans in the southwest, on the 
other hand, were of lower socioeconomic status and created a more traditional immigrant 
community. Their children are likely to continue similar lifestyles and some will 
experience downward assimilation. Cuba is a small island and Cuban exiles were united 
                                                
96 Huntington, Who Are We?, p. 242. 
67
Bueso: Cubans: Anomaly or Pioneers?
Published by Rollins Scholarship Online, 2010
around foreign policy concerns, while Mexicans have differing opinions about Mexican 
politics and come from vastly different areas of their more massive country.
Moreover, in Miami, Spanish speakers occupy a range of employment levels, 
from high ranking bank presidents, politicians and restaurant owners to laborers and 
busboys. The point is that Cubans have support coming from both grassroots levels and 
from top influential positions. They have built a support network and community that 
sustains la Cubanidad. In areas of the southwest, however, Mexicans have lived a 
different experience. They overwhelming work in the agricultural sector and their 
assimilation has been slower by comparison. Thus Cubans are an anomaly compared to 
Mexicans. 
Mexicans are the largest Hispanic group in the United States, representing 66.9 
percent of all Hispanics, and have found strength in numbers – they united over a cultural 
clash they experienced with Americans and have embraced their ancestry.97 This is a 
result of failed assimilation and an effort by lower classes to connect around a common 
cause. This experience is somewhat similar to that of some American blacks, who 
willingly choose not to speak English correctly or to integrate into a society in a 
perceived denigrating way, encouraging such things as, Ebonics. Similar problems 
parallel the Mexican and black experience, such as high teenage pregnancy rates, 
illiteracy, under-absorption into the labor market, and high dropout rates from high 
school.
Until Mexicans are brought into the American culture, they will continue to shout 
“Viva la Raza” and encourage ethnic pride. They were not showered with gifts like the 
                                                
97 “The Hispanic Population in the United States: March 2002,” U.S. Census Bureau, available at: 
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Cubans but faced hostile American cities that did not want to see their numbers grow. 
With threats of building a wall between our two countries, increasing border patrol, 
punishing companies that hire illegal immigrants, and conversations centering  around 
how to reduce their biggest strength (their numbers), Mexicans are not likely to embrace 
the American culture and become an important electorate. Their low naturalization rates 
combined with low socioeconomic characteristics limit the group’s political influence. 
Similar to Anglos, Latino “voting is more common among the educationally and 
economically advantaged.”98 Without the ability to assimilate, to become productive 
members of American society, ethnic groups turn inwardly and begin to develop different 
sets of values. These values often time preclude successive generations from assimilating. 
The decision to look inwardly for support and the concomitant development of opposing 
value systems often damages their economic, educational and societal absorption rates, 
thus causing undue harm and unneeded human suffering. This pattern would have to 
change for Mexican Americans to become an influential electorate. 
Case Study: Cubans and Nicaraguan Americans
The only other country in Latin American to have experienced a communist 
revolution that subsequently caused an influx of immigrants to the U.S. was Nicaragua in 
the late 1970s early 1980s. (The other revolutionary experiences, in Chile and Guatemala, 
never evolved to the point of causing a Diaspora to the U.S. or other adjacent countries.)
Ruled by the Sandinista government, many upper-class and educated Nicaraguans fled 
their homes as the government began to extend its influence over the national economy, 
                                                
98 Louis Desipio and Rodolfo de la Garza, “Forever Seen as New,” in Marcelo Suarez-Orozco and Mariela 
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health and education, in addition to nationalizing private property and befriending the 
Soviet bloc (as Cuba had done a decade earlier). When domestic tensions boiled to the 
point of civil-war, many refugees fled political persecution by immigrating to
neighboring countries and the U.S., expecting to obtain the same benefits Cubans 
received.99 By 1980, about 70,000 Nicaraguans lived in Miami.100 By 2000, 280,000 
Nicaraguans live in the U.S.101
Because of their common reason for departure, many similarities existed between 
Cuban and Nicaraguan exiles. Both groups left a country that had had an American-
backed dictator who was deposed in a revolution. They also came in distinct waves. The 
first wave shared a dislike for the new government in Nicaragua as their jobs and lives 
were threatened by the transition. In the 1980s, the second wave brought white-collar 
professionals to Miami. And the last wave in 1989 consisted of blue-collar workers like 
the Cubans who came in the Mariel boatlift.102
Emigrants tend to be disproportionately of working age, are more likely to have a secondary 
or university-level education, and are more likely to have been employed in a white-collar 
occupation before leaving Managua. In addition, migration tended to come from higher 
income households. 103
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Furthermore, at the time of Nicaraguan emigration, the U.S. was engaged in a 
practice of supporting all non-communist regimes in Latin America, and upon entrance to 
the U.S., Nicaraguans were given some benefits to adjust to American living. About 10 
percent of Nicaraguan applicants were granted political asylum and offered refugee 
assistance, resettlement aid, welfare or government loans. This figure is significantly 
lower than the percent of Cubans who received support (almost 100 percent) but higher 
than the support levels for other Central Americans and Haitians (about 3 percent).104
Nicaraguans that were not granted asylum were given temporary work permits.
Initially, like most immigrants, Nicaraguans experienced downward mobility and,
in the 1980s, it was estimated that 70 percent worked below their skill level.105 While it 
may not be comparable to the amount received by Cubans, they nonetheless received 
assistance in their transition to living and working in the United States.
Some Nicaraguan-American exiles were treated well as they aided in the efforts 
against the Sandinista regime. The U.S. government secretly funded anti-Sandinista 
guerillas or “Contras” and used Nicaraguan exiles living in Miami to aide the Marines, 
CIA, and the National Security Council in bringing down the communist-inspired 
regime.106
Upon their arrival in Miami, political ideology connected the new immigrants 
with the Cuban enclave and eased their merging with established Hispanics. The U.S.
government, however, did not welcome them as they had the Cubans. Nicaraguans were 
considered illegal and not granted permanent residence, nor was their journey from 
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Managua to Miami paid for by the U.S. government, as it was for Cubans. Instead they 
came on tourist visas or illegally entered the U.S. and only subsequently obtained 
permanent residence. Miami residents were not as receptive to Latin American 
immigration after the Mariel boatlift in the early 1980s. Miamians’ original attitude of 
generosity for communist exiles hardened and Nicaraguans were treated as illegals as 
opposed to exiles.107
The third wave of Nicaraguans closely paralleled the Mariel exile experience. 
Nicaraguan workers occupied the poorer regions of Little Havana in Miami, where 
Mariel Cubans had previously lived. The Miami labor market had already been saturated 
by Cubans. Thus, Nicaraguans rented apartments in Little Havana and dodged threats of 
deportation. Their children’s assimilation process was hindered as Nicaraguans had little 
resources available.  However, their in common anti-communist roots bonded 
Nicaraguans with Cubans, and many Nicaraguans found employment in Cuban shops, 
markets, labor industries and factories over other Central American and Haitian 
immigrants. They also helped economically well-off Cubans fill the labor shortage that 
Miami experienced in the mid-1980s.108
The Cubans were treated differently in some important respects. They were given 
the legal right to maintain residence in the U.S.109 Nicaraguans, however, were 
encouraged to return to fight the Sandinistas. President Reagan among others was afraid 
there “could be a tidal wave of refugees – and this time they’ll be feet people and not boat 
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people – swarming into our country seeking a safe haven from Communist repression.”110
The U.S. government wanted them to battle from Honduras rather than the coffee shops 
in Little Havana, as was the case with Cubans who arrived many years before.
Interestingly, it was the Cubans that came to the Nicaraguan’s rescue when the 
U.S. government refused to grant residency to fleeing Nicaraguans. Split between Anglo 
Americans in Miami who argued for greater control of the borders and sympathetic Latin 
groups, the U.S. government heard from a variety of competing interests. CANF 
expressed very vocal support for the Nicaraguan exodus in Washington, Cuban-American 
businesses fundraised to support the Contra rebels, and after the INS granted citizenship 
to over 9,000 Cuban immigrants who subsequently registered Republican in 1984 before 
the presidential election, Washington turned the tide. They stopped deporting illegal 
Nicaraguans, and Attorney General Meese said: “No Nicaraguan who has a well-founded 
fear of persecution will be deported.”111 The approval rate for asylum requests 
subsequently increased from 10 percent to 50 percent.112
Between 1979 and 1988 several Nicaraguans fled the communist regime to Texas 
and Miami through Guatemala and Mexico. By the summer of 1988, it was estimated that 
300 such refugees were entering Miami-Dade County per week.113 For ten years, 
immigrants had entered the U.S. without much notice from the INS, partially because of 
the U.S. support of the contras in Nicaragua and partially because of Cuban lobbyists in 
their favor. As the civil-war came to a close in the late 1980s, the INS reported larger 
numbers of Nicaraguans entering through Texas. The Nicaraguan exodus posed a 
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problem for the federal government’s bankroll and strained the cost of public services. 
Unwilling to grant thousands of unskilled people special benefits as the Cubans had
received, many were granted asylum but were denied benefits. As the immediate costs in 
health and education were felt by Miami residents, Anglo Florida politicians urged the 
federal government to regain control of its borders and stop supporting refugees illegally 
emigrating to the U.S. 
The Cuban-American community organized drives and rallies, and used its 
political influence to change policy toward their fellow anti-communists. When the 
federal government rejected their arrival, tried to deport them and refused special 
benefits, Nicaraguan refugees were still granted access to local community resources. 
Yet, Nicaraguans did not receive an essential benefit to upward mobility – access to 
education. They were denied student loans and federal aid to attend state universities, 
undermining their assimilation into American society.
Some families were able to obtain legal residence in the U.S., which caused an 
assimilation divide between the legal and illegal Nicaraguans.114 Like many immigrants, 
Nicaraguans faced the challenge of prospering financially and achieving acceptance in 
the host society. Their illegal status, combined with their English-speaking limitations,
exaggerated their feelings as outsiders. Professionals worked below their skill level, and 
fearful of deportation, remained in the shadows. They received very little support from 
federal institutions and thus remained vulnerable. 
Cubans were received positively by the Miami residents and were granted 
benefits by the U.S. government that eased their transition and allowed Cubans to 
develop a moral community, la Cubanidad. The opposite occurred for Nicaraguan 
                                                
114 Fernandez-Kelly and Curran, “Nicaraguans: Voices Lost, Voices Found,” p. 129. 
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political exiles. They could not consolidate forces and thrive in a city that rejected their 
arrival. Cubans were granted immediate resident access, given allowances for education 
and the opportunity to advance socioeconomically. Educational attainment was not a 
practical goal when Nicaraguan illegal status prevented them from attending college. 
Eventually the rejection from American society led Nicaraguan immigrants and their 
children to identify as Nicaraguan minorities, which developed into a negative 
connotation.115 Cuban Americans, on the other hand, tend to identify as American and 
had an easier time transitioning into American society. 
As the Contra war came to a close in the late 1980s, the U.S. no longer needed 
support and thus began to encourage Miami Nicaraguans to return to their native country 
to experience a free election. The Cubans could not leave Miami – aside from 
establishing roots in the city, Cuba was still under Castro’s rule. Nicaraguans have 
smaller emigrant communities in the U.S. than do their Central American neighbors; but 
their escape was rooted in political turmoil while others came for economic reasons (as
Mexicans do). It seemed as though the Nicaraguan experience would closely parallel the 
Cuban one, especially considering their business success in Miami in the late 1980s, but 
the time period was too compressed. The upper-class immigrants did not have the 
opportunity to settle and assimilate before the subsequent waves of Nicaraguans came in 
search of similar jobs. As opposed to relying on previous waves of Nicaraguan 
immigrants, they were dependent on the U.S. government and Cuban community. 
Furthermore, the federal government did not embrace their arrival as they had 
done for Cuban refugees, making it more difficult for Nicaraguans to establish their roots. 
                                                
115 Fernandez-Kelly and Curran, “Nicaraguans: Voices Lost, Voices Found,” p. 152. 
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In fact, the government never anticipated Nicaraguans permanently settling in Miami – it 
was seen as a temporary move until the Sandinista regime was ousted. Nicaraguans 
themselves were conflicted between developing strong political ties in the U.S. and 
returning to their home country.116 For many, they had only spent a few years in Miami 
and may have left family members behind. This dilemma deferred them from establishing 
the political influence Cubans exerted. Currently, the Nicaraguan community is quite 
small, representing 5-10 percent of Central Americans living in Miami.117
Several conclusions can be drawn from comparing the Nicaraguan and Cuban 
immigration experiences. If the U.S. prefers to discourage further political refugee 
exoduses from Latin American then it behooves the U.S. to do whatever possible to 
remedy the conditions that caused the out-migration to take place.  If the U.S. prefers to 
prevent Latin American immigrants from becoming a factor in the American political and 
economic arena, then it is clear that they should not bestow benefits on the incoming 
refugee group, preventing their assimilation. Political refugees tend to have above-
average income and education giving them the skill sets to rapidly assimilate into the 
U.S.  
Nicaraguans could have paralleled the Cuban experience but were prevented from 
doing so when the U.S. rejected their naturalization requests. They could not become a 
force in American politics without first assimilating. It is clear from the evidence, 
however, that if the Sandinistas had not lost power and the U.S. openly received 
                                                
116 Sergio Diaz-Briquets and Jorge Perez-Lopez, “Refugee Remittances: Conceptual Issues and the Cuban 
and Nicaraguan Experiences,” International Migration Review, Vol. 31, No. 2. (Summer, 1997), pp. 411-
437.
117 “Miami: Nicaraguans,” http://www.umich.edu/~ac213/student_projects05/miami/nicaraguans.html.
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Nicaraguan exiles, Nicaraguans could have mirrored the Cuban success story and rapidly
assimilated into the U.S.
With Mexican Americans and Nicaraguan Americans in mind, I turn to the final 
discussion of the nuanced political behavior of Cuban Americans and what to expect in 
the next twenty-years from this Hispanic anomaly. 
Cuban Political Preferences
Despite differences in party affiliation, the majority of Cuban-American 
politicians support the embargo against Cuba, appealing to a large mass of voters hoping 
the ban will suffice to topple the regime. The Cuban electorate, however, may not be as 
conservative as thought, based on an analysis relying on this singular variable.  A recent 
poll conducted by Florida International University scholars, found that 56 percent of 
Cuban Americans support the embargo, down from 66 percent two years ago.118 The past 
few years have shown an ideological transition among Cuban Americans from supporting 
a hard-line stance to more lenient policies toward Cuba. The reduction in conservative 
pro-embargo support does not indicate a decline in interest for Cuban policy, as 61 
percent of Cuban Americans say that candidates’ stance on Cuba is very important in 
their decision.119
The tendency to support the Republican Party stems from its perceived harsher 
stance against Castro. As already mentioned, Cuban Americans have an influential role in 
Florida politics and differ from other Hispanics who tend to vote Democrat. Their 
activism in politics derives from their hopes of influencing foreign policy toward Cuba. 
                                                
118 Vanessa Bauza, “Poll: Cuban-Americans Back Change,” Orlando Sentinel, April 3, 2007. 
119 Guillermo Grenier, “Anti-Castro Political Ideology Among Cuban-Americans in the Miami Area: 
Cohort and Generational Differences,” Latino Research. Vol. 2, No. 1, November 2004, p. 5. 
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The voter turnout of Cuban Republicans (who are disproportionately first and second-
wave Cuban immigrants) is higher than that of more recent Cuban immigrants. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, first and second-wave immigrants have greater political 
influence than do the anti-embargo Cuban fourth-wavers -- for three reasons. First, they 
have greater financial stability and can thus contribute generous donations to political 
campaigns and/or PACs. Second, because they emigrated earlier, they are more 
established in the U.S. And third, they are more likely to be naturalized citizens and 
registered voters. Though first and second-wave Cubans dictate much of the policy 
decisions made for Cubans as a group, the table below illustrates the decline in fervency 
since the 1970s in the support for the Republican Party.  
Table 8
Table from Guillermo Grenier, “Anti-Castro Political Ideology Among Cuban Americans in the Miami 
Area: Cohort and Generational Differences,” Latino Research. Vol. 2, No. 1, November 2004.
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Thus, the next few decades should show a dramatic transition in partisanship 
among Cubans. As the more recent immigrants continue to assimilate and perhaps gain 
political clout as well, their Republican affiliation will diminish. This hypothesis is 
further supported by data collected by Guillermo Grenier and the Florida International 
University’s Cuban Research Institute. 
 According to the above table, the hardliner stance on Cuba diminished with 
successive generations and place of birth. This is significant for future policies, because 
as the population of U.S.-born Cuban Americans increases, they are less likely to support 
the Republican Party and less likely to focus on Cuban foreign policy as the predominant 
issue. Furthermore, U.S. born Cubans are more likely to speak English, read English 
newspapers, are more educated and more likely to intermarry because they are integrated 
in American society.120 This reduces the extent of which exiles pass their strong ideology 
to their children, especially as their children are exposed to other ideas through English-
language media. As they become more assimilated, traditional Cuban foreign policy 
concerns will become less important to them.
While Cuban Americans continue to favor the Republican Party because of its 
anti-Castro ideology, and while exiles have successfully passed such sentiments to their 
offspring, Cuban-Americans have also become politically diverse in the past forty years. 
This is due to generational differences as well as the cohort differences. Furthermore, 
while policies tightening the embargo and restricting travel support interests of the 
wealthy and incorporated cohorts, the policies neglect to address more recent émigrés and 
                                                
120 Alex Stepick and Carol Dutton Stepick, “Power and Identity: Miami Cubans,” in Marcelo Suarez-Orozo 
and Mariela Paez, Latinos: Remaking America (Los Angeles: California University Press, 2002), p. 73.
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the 20,000 immigrants allowed to migrate annually. Guided by family ties and 
socioeconomic issues, third and fourth-wave cohorts support the Democratic Party and 
favor policies that help the people remaining in Cuba.121
The recent immigrants, however, lack political might for several reasons, 
including their ignorance of the political process. Unaware of the extent of civil liberties 
in the U.S. and burdened by the political process in Cuba, many have turned their heads 
away from American politics. They grew up in a communist system that did not allow for 
electoral competition. They have no experience with political action committees, nor do 
they understand the importance of registering to vote. Recent émigrés that do recognize 
the importance of politics feel they lack financial influence. Contemporary politics, 
however, has seen the rise of this cohort as President Bush’s restrictions on travel to Cuba 
and the demise of Castro’s health has mobilized this dormant immigrant wave. 
Table 9
Table from Guillermo Grenier, “Anti-Castro Political Ideology Among Cuban Americans in the Miami 
Area: Cohort and Generational Differences,” Latino Research. Vol. 2, No. 1, November 2004.
                                                
121 Guillermo Grenier, “Anti-Castro Political Ideology Among Cuban-Americans in the Miami Area: 
Cohort and Generational Differences,” Latino Research. Vol. 2, No. 1, November 2004, p. 7. 
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The Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 and the Helms-Burton Act of 1996 were both 
examples of the power of CANF to influence public policy through monetary 
contributions and mobilizing Cuban Americans in Miami. More recent debates led by 
humanitarian organizations, however, have called for ending the embargo because of its 
damage to the people on the island. As the fear of communism recedes among 
Americans, as staunchly conservative Cuban Americans either pass away or weaken their 
stance, as CANF’s influence dwindles, and as Castro’s health continues to decline, we 
may well see a movement among Cuban Americans partnered with businesses to reopen 
trade. Moreover, second-generation Cuban Americans and younger Cuban immigrants 
never experienced Castro’s revolution and thus have more moderate and flexible stances
on the embargo. While “the power established by the older Miami Cubans, however, 
exhibits an inertia that will probably mask the community’s evolution for some time to 
come,”122 I predict that by 2020, hardliners will have passed away, allowing for changed 
foreign policy views toward Cuba.
 Younger Cubans are not the only ones with more moderate stances. More 
recently, the agribusiness lobby, Chamber of Commerce and American Farm Bureau 
Federation pressed to reopen trade with Cuba. They have already secured the interest of 
farm-state representatives and made headway with lessening some of the agricultural 
restrictions. The Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 
addressed some of the agribusiness concerns. The legislation liberalizes export 
regulations on agricultural and medical commodities. In 2004, Cuba imported $380 
                                                
122 Alex Stepick and Carol Dutton Stepick, “Power and Identity: Miami Cubans,” in Marcelo Suarez-Orozo 
and Mariela Paez, Latinos: Remaking America (Los Angeles: California University Press, 2002), p. 87.
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million worth of agricultural exports from the U.S., accounting for 44 percent of total 
imports to Cuba.123
Representatives of U.S. industry alongside recent émigrés and moderate Cuban-
American voters support relaxing the embargo. The growing moderate Cuban-American 
community will overtake the isolationist perspective of the pro-embargo voters. Younger 
generations still lack the financial resources to make their voices heard among public 
officials; however, the data presented points to a real change taking place in South 
Florida politics. The “Golden Enclave” reign is coming to an end and politicians will 
need to look for support among other Cuban-American constituents. The unraveling of 
the hard-line stance stigma will take years to overcome, but politicians should start to 
capitalize on these changes in the near future, especially as the Cuban-American vote is 
central to candidates’ ability to win Florida. 
Conclusion
After evaluating the Cuban-American Diaspora and the case studies of Mexican 
Americans who emigrate for economic reasons and Nicaraguan Americans who came 
seeking political asylum, it is obvious that Cubans are an anomaly. In addition to being 
skilled immigrants, part of the secret to their success in the U.S. was the amount of 
government support received to ease their transition. The Cubans were not treated merely 
as Spanish-speaking immigrants or left on the fringe of society as other immigrants were 
in the past but, instead, were integrated into the Miami community. This integration on 
the part of the Cubans and the benefits they were awarded allowed for increased upward 
                                                
123 Foreign Agricultural Service, available at: http://www.fas.usda.gov/itp/cuba/cuba-faq.html#export
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mobility and assimilation, leading to successes in business, politics, the arts, and 
academia that other immigrant groups have not enjoyed. 
Perhaps the secret to advanced assimilation and integration into the American 
mainstream is receiving multiple forms of support from the American government. 
Assume that Cuban Americans were anomalies simply because they were the only 
immigrant group to receive such benefits. Both Mexicans and Nicaraguans created exile 
communities, but neither group achieved much success on the whole. Without programs 
to revalidate degrees, or grant them access to citizenship, Hispanic immigrants were 
historically left by the wayside. These immigrants typically reside in poorer communities 
where education and financial success are not necessarily group norms. 
Cubans, on the other hand, are credited for the economic transformation of 
Miami. It is important to discredit the theory that Cubans were successful solely because 
of their commitment to education or other unique traits. It is not uncommon for Miami 
Cubans to attribute their successes to hard work, stating “We Cubans made Miami.”124
Cubans arrived in Miami with extended social networks, high educational attainment and 
wealth, and a non-African racial status, much like other wealthy immigrant groups. 
Rather, the difference between other immigrants and Cubans was the way in which they 
were received, enabling them to become the nation’s success story. 
While granting benefits such as access to education and health services, loans, fast 
tracks to citizenship, and revalidating degrees seems like a strain on the economy, the 
argument must be made that these short-term costs are less than those experienced by a 
neglected minority in the long-term.  This was proven conclusively when the state of 
                                                
124 Alex Stepick and Carol Dutton Stepick, “Power and Identity: Miami Cubans,” in Marcelo Suarez-Orozo 
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Florida sued the federal government in an attempt to collect what state officials saw as 
funds spent only because federal policies of accepting immigrants were affecting them 
adversely.125 The federal government did agree that the first five years had a negative 
effect on state and municipal coffers but said the long-term effect was positive and 
beneficial, even for those arriving with little or no English and little or no work 
experience or education relevant to the American job market. 
Marielito Cubans overcame many obstacles and some put to rest claims that 
communism teaches the workforce to develop bad work habits, and that the populace in 
general is basically dependent on government transfer payments.126  They did not have 
much education before arriving in the U.S., but obtained it once here.  Most did not speak 
English, have professional titles or any sui-generic talent, and most did not have 
significant managerial or other experience that they could rely on to work in the U.S.  
These Cubans parallel their Mexican cousins’ skill sets more closely than did the first 
wave of Nicaraguans or Cubans who immigrated to the U.S.  They succeeded, however,
because of the safety net put in place by the U.S. federal government, the Church groups 
and other private charities, and the affluent and not-so-affluent Cubans already in Miami.
Many Mexicans immigrants are fearful of being deported and are thus not 
naturalized. Mexican Americans will not be a force in the American political because 
they have yet to surpass linguistic barriers, are not given the opportunity to naturalize, 
and, as was evidenced previously, are experiencing downward assimilation. Mexicans-
Americans are thus marginalized. 
                                                
125 “Immigration Impact: Florida,” Federation for American Immigration Reform, available at: 
http://www.fairus.org/site/PageServer?pagename=research_researcha956. 
126 Portes and Stepick, City on the Edge, p. 36. 
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Nicaraguans could have been a politically viable voting bloc as Cubans but were 
not received positively. The Nicaraguan case study evidenced that the lack of federal 
government aid was a large part of why their assimilation process never advanced. The 
difference between Cuban Americans and Nicaraguan Americans was the way in which 
they were received. Alike in reasons for departure and socioeconomic status, the benefits 
bestowed on Cubans allowed for them to assimilate to American society. 
Comparatively, recent Venezuelan immigrants may experience a plight like that 
of Cubans and Nicaraguans. Escaping political persecution and the decline of their 
democratic regime, the first Venezuelans to leave were wealthy upper-classes. While they 
do not receive the same incentives to become incorporated into the American system, a 
Venezuelan case study would be interesting to follow.
In contrast to the grim situation Mexican Americans face, there are several 
reasons to be hopeful for improvements in Hispanic political incorporation. The case 
studies discussed in this thesis point to divergence among Hispanic groups. However, 
identifying the variable that enabled political incorporation for Cuban Americans 
provides hope for the future. 
This thesis supports, I believe, that all legal immigrants should be provided 
assimilating benefits, such as professional title revalidation.  How much better a society 
would we be today if we had extended the same level of courtesy to professionals from 
Russia, Italy, Poland, Germany, and other nations? By rapidly assimilating immigrants 
we prevent a huge drain in our society. One drain is that imposed on hospital of last resort 
by undocumented and uninsured immigrants.  Another is obviously the millions of 
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dollars it takes to produce doctors, engineers and other professionals when quick 
revalidation and certifications can save society time and money.
The key findings suggest that in order for immigrants to successfully integrate 
into the American mainstream political, they must first embark upon their assimilation 
process. The extent of Hispanic immigrant involvement in civic and political life is 
dependent on economic and educational assimilation. While I recognize that pathways to 
political incorporation may also be motivated by concerns in their country of origin, we 
should expect that immigrants who assimilate socially and economically also assimilate 
politically and learn to adopt views that can be applied within the American liberal-
conservative spectrum. 
In contrast, immigrants who do not learn English and are not educated will not 
assimilate, especially in terms of socioeconomic status. As a consequence they may 
remain marginal to American political life. Recently there have been movements to 
integrate Latinos politically through the impact of particular policies, on the mobilization 
efforts of advocacy groups, or attention given by election candidates. It is obvious that 
well educated, high-skilled immigrants and their children are more economically and 
politically successful than are low-skilled, more recent immigrants. The same holds true 
for American citizens; high socioeconomic status Americans participate in politics more 
than do Americans of lower socioeconomic status. It is possible for political dynamics to 
work differently for Hispanic immigrants; they do not have to be wealthy but merely 
accepted as members of the host country to participate in politics.
The Cuban experience is an anomaly but it is one from which we can draw many 
successful lessons.  The first is that immigrants need to feel as though they are a part of 
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the system, not that they can never penetrate the layers of obstacles precluding them from 
becoming part of the norm. The onus is on the federal government to prevent illegal 
immigration, but to foster assimilation among those whom it legally allows in. Cubans, 
and to a smaller extent Nicaraguans, have proven that the assimilation curve can be 
expedited and American society served best by offering immigrants a hand up.  
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MIAMI: PHOTOGRAPHS THROUGH TIME
Photograph 1: The Freedom Tower in Miami was used by the federal government to provide 
medical services to Cuban refugees arriving in the 1960s and early 1970s.
www.latinamericanstudies.org/refugee-center.htm
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Photograph 3: The U.S. government sponsored flights from Cuba to Miami 
transporting first-wave Cubans escaping political persecution immediately 
after the revolution. 
www.latinamericanstudies.org/refugee-center.htm
Photograph 2: Once inside the Freedom Tower, Cuban refugees were documented, provided clothing 
and medical assistance. 
www.latinamericanstudies.org/refugee-center.htm
93
Bueso: Cubans: Anomaly or Pioneers?
Published by Rollins Scholarship Online, 2010
Photograph 4: This political cartoon illustrates the perceptions of Mariel Boatlift refugees as 
criminals. Translated as follows: “Who denies the freedom of others, does not deserve the same.”
www.nocastro.com/gallery/index.htm
Photograph 5: During the Mariel Boatlift, Cuban citizens were permitted to leave the 
island in personal vessels from Mariel Harbor in Cuba to the U.S.
www.cubaencuentro.com
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Photograph 6: Balseros often transformed 1950 automobiles into rafts to venture through the 90-
mile distance between Cuba and South Florida.
www.latinamericanstudies.org/refugee-center.htm
Photograph 8: Balseros suffering from heat exhaustion and 
malnutrition call for help.
www.latinamericanstudies.org/refugee-center.htm
Photograph 7: Fourth-wave Cubans typically 
referred to as Balseros are sometimes intercepted 
at sea by local authorities and sent back to Cuba. 
www.latinamericanstudies.org/refugee-center.htm
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Photograph 9: President Bush welcomed to Miami by employees at the famous Versailles restaurant 
on Calle Ocho. The 1950s styled restaurant is a popular meeting center for TV crews and Cubans 
when updates on Cuban policy or Castro’s health airs.  
Blogs.abcnews.com
Photograph 10: Senator Mel Martinez (R-FL) is congratulated by the 
exile community after his victory over Betty Castor in 2004, becoming 
the first Cuban-American Senator.
canf.org/.../2004-nov-05-martinez-arrives.htm
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Photograph 11: Almost fifty years after the Cuban Revolution and first-wave exiles 
continue to gather to play dominoes on Calle Ocho. 
www.amergeog.org
Photograph 12: Cuban Americans often engage in political 
protest displaying both the Cuban and American flags. 
www.latinamericanstudies.org/refugee-center.htm
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Photograph 12: Brickell Avenue in 1959 before the Cuban exodus to Miami
Skyscrapercity.com
Photograph 14: Brickell Avenue in 2000
Skyscrapercity.com
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